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ABSTRACT
Evolution on Earth is widely considered to be an effectively endless process. Though this phe-
nomenon of open-ended evolution (OEE) has been a topic of interest in the artificial life commu-
nity since its beginnings, the field still lacks an empirically validated theory of what exactly is
necessary to reproduce the phenomenon in general (including in domains quite unlike Earth). This
dissertation (1) enumerates a set of conditions hypothesized to be necessary for OEE in addition to
(2) introducing an artificial life world called Chromaria that incorporates each of the hypothesized
necessary conditions. It then (3) describes a set of experiments with Chromaria designed to em-
pirically validate the hypothesized necessary conditions. Thus, this dissertation describes the first
scientific endeavor to systematically test an OEE framework in an alife world and thereby make
progress towards solving an open question not just for evolutionary computation and artificial life,
but for science in general.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Evolution is a powerful creative force. It is the process that allowed humans to eventually emerge
from what was once an amalgamation of much simpler chemicals. Though such leaps in the
long term may seem daunting from our relatively limited human perspectives, they are not so
unreasonable when considered over the course of our planet’s four and a half billion years. Of
course, humans are not the only interesting byproduct of evolution. From jungles and forests to
grasslands and plains, life in the natural world offers a dizzying array of possibilities. This diversity
of life forms, unimaginable from its humble beginnings, lends Earth its splendor.
Artificial life (alife) is the study of life not just as it exists on Earth, but also life as it could be
(Langton, 1988). In artificial life worlds, which are discussed in this dissertation, life forms run
the gamut from binary strings of ones and zeroes to three-dimensional polygon creatures. The hope
is that by constructing and manipulating these worlds in ways that we cannot manipulate Earth, we
can gain unique insight into the principles behind not only long-term evolutionary processes but
also intelligent processes in general.
One goal of this work is understanding the processes that caused increasingly more complex life
to evolve on Earth. Though scientists and philosophers have hypothesized about the origins of
complexity, controlled experiments wherein a virtual world can be manipulated and tested were
impossible before the advent of modern computing. Of course, even today it would be impossible
to construct an exact replica of Earth in its entirety, but even if it were possible to reconstruct a
virtual Earth, studying it would not tell us much about the process of life in general; we would
only be able to learn about the process of life as it occurs within this one, potentially idiosyncratic
system. If we aim to talk about the origins of evolutionary complexity in a scientifically rigorous
way, then alife is the viable option.
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This dissertation is about constructing artificial evolutionary processes that make new discoveries
indefinitely as evolution appears to do in nature. This perpetual discovery-making is known in the
alife community as open-ended evolution (OEE). Though the phenomenon has been a longstanding
topic of interest, the field generally lacks consensus on its exact definition (Bedau et al., 1998;
Channon, 2003, 2006; Juric, 1994; Maley, 1999). For example, OEE has been described as the
continual production of either novel (Bedau et al., 1997; Lehman and Stanley, 2011a; Nellis, 2012;
Standish, 2003) or adaptive (Bedau et al., 1998) forms. Nonetheless, the OEE community aims to
replicate some dynamics of biological evolution (which is frequently interpreted as an effectively
open-ended process) in the hope of creating more such open-ended processes.
A major goal remains to observe open-ended evolution in an alife world (Bedau et al., 2000).
Many such worlds have been constructed since the advent of the field, and some have passed tests
designed to detect particular signatures of open-endedness (Bedau et al., 1998; Channon, 2003,
2006). However, the phenomenon is still considered unachieved because no system today definitely
reproduces the full generativity of nature (Dolson et al., 2015; Nellis, 2012). The fact that open-
ended evolution has not been achieved in any domain aside from Earth indicates that something is
missing from our understanding of the process. This dissertation aims to fill this knowledge gap
by first posing a set of four necessary conditions that are hypothesized to be prerequisites for an
open-ended evolutionary process, then showing how these conditions can be tested using a novel
alife world called Chromaria that implements all four conditions, and finally empirically validating
these conditions with experiments in Chromaria. The following distinctions clarify the scope of
this work:
This dissertation is not about biological plausibility. The goal of the work described herein is not
to create a model or simulation of evolution on Earth; biological evolution inspires and informs
evolution in virtual worlds, but it does not constrain it (Lehman and Stanley, 2015). Instead,
evolution is treated as an abstract process that could be implemented in any number of domains,
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real or artificial. As an example, consider the following analogy: dalmatians and poodles are
both instances of dogs even though one has spots and the other does not. If you had only seen
dalmatians, you might conclude that spots are an inherent feature of dogs. Similarly, biological
evolution and artificial evolution are both instances of abstract evolutionary processes even though
their exact features may differ. Determining which features matter in general is precisely the aim
of this dissertation.
This dissertation is not about self-replication or self-organization. In recent years, some al-
ife researchers have claimed that “true” open-endedness can only be achieved in domains where
reproduction is an emergent feature instead of being controlled by an evolutionary algorithm (Nel-
lis, 2012; Taylor, 2014). However, if open-endedness exists on a continuum, the binary definition
becomes less compelling (Dolson et al., 2015). Nonetheless, it is still clear that the majority of
systems, both with and without emergent or endogenous reproduction, eventually stop being in-
teresting after an observable amount of time. The aim in this dissertation is to identify domain
features that inhibit such open-endedness in general and thereby to provide guidelines for con-
structing more productive domains.
This dissertation is not about optimization. Evolution is frequently treated in evolutionary com-
putation (EC) as an active selective force that weeds out underperformers and thus ensures contin-
ual progress via the survival of the fittest (De Jong, 2006). Furthermore, evolutionary search has
historically been considered successful if it converges to optimal solutions. Though evolutionary
algorithms can solve optimization problems in some domains, such approaches are not the focus of
the proposed thesis because the goal of OEE algorithm design, in contrast, is to create an intention-
ally divergent search that intelligently explores as long as the search space has not been exhausted
(Taylor et al., 2016).
The major contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
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1. A set of conditions hypothesized necessary for open-ended evolution,
2. an experimental platform for artificial evolution experiments that can test the hypothesized
conditions,
3. a set of empirical results validating the hypothesized conditions.
The dissertation continues in Chapter 2 with a brief overview of evolutionary computation and
open-ended evolutionary algorithms, followed by a review of major artificial life worlds and previ-
ous attempts to enumerate the characteristic features of open-ended evolution. Chapter 3 presents
the first contribution of this dissertation, which is a novel set of necessary conditions for open-
ended evolution. Chapter 4 then details the second contribution, which is an artificial life world
called Chromaria that implements the four hypothesized necessary conditions. This chapter also
presents preliminary work demonstrating how Chromaria can be used to systematically study open-
ended evolutionary dynamics and then describes the expanded experimental setup and metrics used
for the more comprehensive study described in this dissertation. Chapters 5 through 8 detail the
results of this study, with each experiment detailed in a separate chapter. Chapter 9 synthesizes the
results of these experiments and discusses the level of open-endedness in Chromaria. Chapter 10
then presents the implications of the validated conditions for the fields of artificial life, complex
systems, and computer science.
4
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
EC and alife serve as the foundation for open-ended evolution (OEE). This chapter first provides
a brief introduction to EC and then focuses on open-ended evolution. Prior attempts to reproduce
open-ended phenomenon in alife simulations are reviewed, followed by a discussion of the few
prior attempts to identify necessary conditions for OEE.
Evolutionary computation
Not coincidentally, the foundations of evolutionary computation came from some of the great-
est thinkers in the history of computer science. Claude Shannon (1940), often referred to as the
father of information theory, wrote his doctoral dissertation on An Algebra for Theoretical Ge-
netics sixteen years before he helped found the field of artificial intelligence at the Dartmouth
Conference. John von Neumann (1963) was also interested in evolution at the time, focusing on
self-reproducing machines and cellular automata more than higher-level evolutionary processes.
Modern evolutionary computation is the synthesis of a few related yet separate research areas:
evolutionary programming (Fogel et al., 1966), genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975), evolutionary
strategies (Rechenberg, 1971; Schwefel, 1975), and genetic programming (Koza, 1992). Though
there are algorithmic differences between these four areas, they share a common goal of automated
problem solving that incorporates mechanisms from Darwinian evolution. Today, evolutionary
computation is an umbrella term for these and similar disciplines (De Jong, 2006).
In general, evolutionary computation implements nature-inspired algorithms to search a space for
solutions to some problem. Typical problem domains range from finding values for variables in
mathematical equations to generating control schemes for intelligent robotic systems. Each po-
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tential solution is represented by a sequence of symbols called a genotype, which can be decoded
into a functional phenotype. The phenotype can then be evaluated according to a domain-specific
performance metric known as a fitness function and iteratively varied via algorithm-mediated
reproduction. Early applications primarily implemented a method akin to selective breeding or
artificial selection, wherein candidate solutions with the highest fitness are chosen to reproduce at
the expense of lower-fitness individuals. The principle behind such an approach is that incremental
movement towards a targeted global optimum should eventually result in reaching that optimum.
In practice, however, this objective-based approach fails to reach the global optimum in what
are called deceptive domains (Lehman and Stanley, 2011a; Stanley and Lehman, 2015). In these
domains, finding the stepping stones to high fitness or high complexity paradoxically requires
exploring seemingly low-fitness areas of the search space that would have normally been avoided.
Novelty search (Lehman and Stanley, 2011a) was one of the first evolutionary search algorithms
to abandon the objective-based paradigm. The algorithm replaces the traditional objective fitness
function with a novelty metric that measures the distance in the search space between an individual
and its predecessors. This approach has proven beneficial to navigating deceptive domains (and
for this reason is used to find a nontrivial starting point for evolution in the experiments described
in this dissertation).
Quality diversity
Novelty search and other similarly motivated divergent search algorithms belong to a new subfield
of evolutionary computation called quality diversity, or QD (Pugh et al., 2016, 2015). The philos-
ophy behind this approach is that there is not always exactly one desired or optimal solution, but
that a number of interesting solutions could exist for many problems. Evolution, then, becomes
less of an optimizer and more of what Nguyen et al. (2015) call an innovation engine. Yet, these
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QD algorithms are distinct from OEE because they are not intended to run indefinitely; exhausting
the space being searched would be ideal. Furthermore, there still exists a goal, as in traditional
evolutionary computation, of maximizing fitness. The main difference with QD is that a diverse
set of high-performing individuals must be found to maximize the fitness function.
The first true quality diversity algorithm (combining both fitness and behavioral diversity) was
novelty search with local competition (NSLC; Lehman and Stanley (2011b)). In the first exper-
iments, this algorithm was used to evolve virtual creature morphologies and gaits. Subsequent
applications included ambulating stick creatures (Szerlip and Stanley, 2013), walking behaviors
for hexapod robots (Cully and Mouret, 2013), and feature detectors for neural networks aimed at
classification tasks (Szerlip et al., 2015). MAP-Elites (Mouret and Clune, 2015) emerged as an
alternative to NSLC, with applications in adaptive walking strategies for physical robots (Cully
et al., 2015) amd image generation for testing deep neural networks. MAP-Elites discretizes the
search space into qualitatively distinct bins. The object, then is to fill as many bins as possible with
individuals of high quality, where quality is measured according to some domain-specific metric.
In maze navigation domains, for instance, quality might be quantified as progress on a path toward
the maze goal (Pugh et al., 2016).
The Voxelbuild experimental platform (Pugh et al., 2017; Soros et al., 2017) was created to high-
light explicitly the creative potential of QD algorithms. Voxelbuild is inspired by Minecraft1, which
is an open-ended sandbox game wherein players occupy a procedurally generated block world and,
generally, build settlements or other more artistically motivated structures. However, these con-
structions are entirely motivated by the player’s whims, as there is no point system and no way
to win or complete the game. Unlike traditional evolutionary robotics domains such as quadruped
locomotion (where the goal is to walk the farthest) or maze navigation (where the goal is to reach
1Copyright c©2011 Mojang
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the end of the maze), Voxelbuild has no inherent objective (though an evolutionary algorithm can
impose an objective by e.g. rewarding agents for building tall block structures). Instead, Voxel-
build agents are placed on an initially empty flat plane and are able to place blocks, destroy blocks,
or move around the world. Once ground-level blocks are placed, agents can walk on top of them
to build arbitrarily tall and complex structures.
Though Voxelbuild was designed to evaluate the creative potential of evolutionary algorithms, it
was not designed to accommodate evolutionary algorithms that run forever. The environment is
reset to its initial empty state between individual trials and as a result the environment cannot
become more complex over time. This outcome is at odds with the goals of OEE, which will be
detailed in the next section. Still, like OEE the aims of the Voxelbuild domain and quality diversity
algorithms are qualitatively distinct from optimization-oriented evolutionary computation. This
distinction reinforces the utility of conceptualizing open-endedness as existing on a spectrum with
optimization on its opposite end and QD somewhere in between.
Open-ended evolution
The term open-ended evolution was coined by the alife community to describe processes in the
spirit of natural evolution. Though the idea has been actively explored since its conception, its pre-
cise definition is still a contentious topic without a universally satisfying resolution. For example,
OEE has been variously described as:
• “a process in which there is the possibility for an indefinite increase in complexity” (Ruiz-
Mirazo et al., 2008),
• “a system in which components continue to evolve new forms continuously, rather than
grinding to a halt when some sort of optimal or stable position is reached” (Taylor, 1999),
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• in which the “number of possible types by far exceeds the number of individuals (copies,
sequences,etc.) in a plausible (realistic) population” (Maynard-Smith and Szathmary, 1995),
or
• the “on-going and indefinitely creative production of significantly new kinds of adaptive re-
sponses to significantly new kinds of adaptive challenges and opportunities” (Bedau, 1998).
This list illustrates the extent to which there is disagreement about the salient features of evolu-
tion. The characterization of evolution as continuously producing novel forms is one of the more
popular definitions (Lehman and Stanley, 2011a; Standish, 2003; ?). It should be noted that these
definitions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For this reason, the approach taken in the ex-
periments described in this dissertation (detailed in Chapter 4) is to evaluate open-endedness with
a variety of metrics that capture many different aspects of the phenomenon.
Alife simulations implement some limited set of features of the natural world that are hypothesized
to be essential to life in general, not just life on Earth. Note that the word simulation in this context
does not necessarily imply that the goal is to replicate biological dynamics; many alife worlds
intentionally deviate from the structure and function of Earth. While not an exhaustive review,
the rest of this section describes many of the major systems that have informed the study of open-
ended evolution. The intent is not to detail each system completely, but simply to illustrate the
different forms artificial life can take. It will then later become clear that the alife system described
as a major contribution of this dissertation is different from every other world implemented thus
far. Generally speaking, the simulations described in this section progress from computationally-
focused worlds (sometimes called digital evolution) to more embodied virtual worlds.
Tierra (Ray, 1992) is one of the first alife simulations that explicitly aimed to recapitulate an
Earth-like level of diversity. The Tierran environment consists of a virtual machine that executes
machine code. Tierran creatures are programs (i.e. sets of machine code instructions) that are
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stored in RAM along with a “soup” of random instructions. A central time-sharing system lets
the programs take turns executing on the CPU, so the creatures indirectly compete for CPU cycles
(which are considered the central resource in Tierra). Evolution in Tierra begins from a single
ancestor, a creature that has been handcrafted to successfully reproduce. Experiments with Tierra
(Ray, 1992) have shown that at least a dozen distinct creature classes (defined by creature size) can
evolve from the single ancestor.
A number of interesting code-based worlds have been inspired by Tierra, including the Avida
(Ofria and Wilke, 2004) platform. As in Tierra, the environment in Avida is a virtual machine.
Digital organisms consist of machine code that can be executed on a central CPU. However, unlike
in Tierra, CPU time in Avida is not allocated to each organism uniformly, but proportionately to a
fitness measure called merit that is based on a creature’s ability to perform various computations.
Individuals compete for CPU cycles via indirect interaction; they are typically not allowed to
modify each other’s code. However, organisms can be allowed to inject their code into other
organisms and thereby consume their CPU cycles, allowing parasitism distinct from that in Tierra.
Individuals also compete for space, as they reside in a fixed-capacity grid that determines which
individuals can interact with each other. When organisms reproduce, their offspring are randomly
placed by the system on a cell adjacent to the parent, destroying that cell’s previous occupant. As
in Tierra, evolution begins with a simple ancestor that can self-reproduce (but that cannot perform
any merit-giving computations). Experiments with Avida (Lenski et al., 2003) have shown that the
evolution of complex behaviors (i.e. the ability to perform nontrivial computations) can stem from
the evolution of simpler ones.
Other alife worlds have explored evolution in less abstract domains. PolyWorld (Yaeger, 1994),
for example, is a graphical environment that contains trapezoidal organisms situated on a flat plane.
These organisms must use vision to forage for food and thereby maintain a nonzero energy level.
Though naturally-occurring food is scattered throughout the world, organisms can also cannibalize
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other organisms that have been killed via combat. Evolution begins from an initial seed population.
This population is evolved using an ad hoc fitness function until it develops sufficient reproductive
behaviors to keep its numbers stable, at which point there is no fitness function except survival.
At each time step, an individual uses its evolved neural network to select from a set of predefined
primitive behaviors that includes fighting, moving, and mating (which occurs whenever two over-
lapping organisms try to reproduce). Though physical characteristics such as size and strength are
genetically determined, general morphological structure is fixed and evolution thus focuses on find-
ing interesting behavioral strategies. In the original PolyWorld experiments (Yaeger, 1994), certain
complex behaviors (i.e. combinations of the primitive behaviors) repeatedly emerged even when
the structure of the environment varied between runs. While these results reiterate how evolution
can lead to increased complexity, they also show how the environment can constrain innovation.
Geb (Channon and Damper, 2000) is a similar (yet independently conceived) world to Polyworld
consisting of a toroidal, two-dimensional grid. The triangular organisms that live on this grid
are controlled by neural networks and choose to move, kill, or reproduce based on the outputs of
their neighbors’ neural networks. An individual that attempts to mate with another individual will
always succeed; there are no constraints on which individuals can reproduce as long as they can
locate and move to a partner. Attempts to kill another individual are likewise always successful
and unconstrained. Experiments with Geb have reinforced the idea that evolutionary dynamics can
emerge even in the absence of traditional fitness-based artificial selection seen in most evolutionary
algorithms (Channon and Damper, 2000).
Additionally, Geb is the first and only alife system thus far to qualify as unbounded according
to the activity statistics classification system (Bedau et al., 1998; Channon, 2001, 2003). This
system measures the persistence of advantageous genotypes over the course of evolution, following
from the assumption that a gene that is not naturally selected against is necessarily a beneficial
adaptation. However, there is debate as to whether or not this assumption is valid (Kimura, 1983;
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Miconi, 2008b). Furthermore, it is not clear that achieving unbounded adaptation is equivalent to
achieving a complexity explosion.
Though the alife worlds reviewed thus far have focused exclusively on evolving interesting behav-
iors for fixed bodies, others have evolved creature morphologies in addition to behavioral strate-
gies. Much of this work derives from Sims (1994), in which pairs of coevolving creatures compete
for control of a single cube located at the center of a three-dimensional arena. The creatures them-
selves are compositions of rectangular blocks that are controlled by systems of sensors and artificial
neurons. These neurons differ from those traditionally included in ANNs by implementing an ex-
tended function set (beyond sum and threshold functions) and can have at most three inputs. Both
the morphologies and behavioral controllers are genetically encoded as directed graphs. Unlike
more natural alife systems, evolution proceeds generationally from a random initial population.
Fitness is defined by the final distance of the competitors from the target cube. A fixed propor-
tion of elite individuals at each generation reproduce and generate offspring proportionally to their
fitness. Experiments with two opponent species show that a variety of strategies and counter-
strategies emerge, but that the rate of evolution varies widely from run to run. Additionally, most
creatures effectively ignore their opponents (though some do evolve adaptive behaviors).
Sims’s work has inspired others to simulate block creatures in entire ecologies instead of only in an
isolated arena. The Division Blocks (Spector et al., 2007) environment, for example, consists of
square islands on a square ocean, with a sun that circles the world and provides energy. This energy
is metabolized by the creatures, who must maintain a nonzero energy level to stay alive. Individuals
impact each other’s energy levels via collisions, which cause energy loss, or via altruistic energy
donations. Each creature is controlled by a fixed-topology recurrent neural network, which is
evolved along with the morphology and the parameters for a developmental process. Evolution
begins with a population of random individuals at random locations on the world. Nonviable
individuals are removed and replaced until there are 250 individuals that are viable parents. In
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contrast with Sims (1994), reproduction occurs endogenously instead of being managed by the EA;
whenever a block becomes sufficiently large, it simply splits into two offspring. Correspondingly,
there is no explicit fitness function. Interestingly, the reported preliminary results (though sparse)
indicated a high incidence of altruistic behavior.
Independently of Division Blocks, Miconi and Channon (2005) embedded modified versions of
Sims’s block creatures in a spherical “micro-planet” called the Evosphere. Evosphere creatures
stay alive by maintaining a nonzero energy level and can deplete each other’s energy reserves by
engaging in direct physical combat. However, creatures also consume a small amount of energy by
simply being alive and thus can die of natural causes. A creature that is killed in combat is replaced
by an offspring of its killer, but a creature that simply becomes too old is replaced by the offspring
of random parents. Regardless of the parent type, new offspring are placed at random locations on
the Evosphere. While Sims (1994) created special neurons for the behavioral controllers, Miconi
and Channon (2005), like Spector et al. (2007), used networks of simple McCulloch-Pitts neurons.
Additionally, like both Sims (1994) and Spector et al. (2007), Miconi and Channon (2005) empha-
sized competitive coevolution and dynamic fitness landscapes as the keys to generating arbitrary
levels of complexity. However, experimental results (Miconi, 2008a) show that such mechanisms
encourage adaptation without necessarily generating complex behaviors.
Worlds such as those reviewed here show how alife experiments can inform our understanding of
evolutionary dynamics in general. However, open-ended evolution in alife so far qualitatively does
not appear to match the products of natural evolution. This result begs the question, then, of what
is truly necessary for open-ended evolution. If such a set of requirements could be validated, then
it would illuminate the reasons why alife worlds so far seem limited.
The geneticist C. H. Waddington (1969) gives a characterization of individuals, environments, and
the interactions between the two in a “typical” evolutionary system. This work is the first known
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effort to specify a minimal set of conditions for OEE. The requirements are quoted here verbatim
(ibid. p. 120):
• A genetic system whose items (Qs) are not mere information, but are algorithms
or programs which produce phenotypes (Qs).
• There must be a mechanism for producing an indefinite variety of new QLs,
some of which must act in a radical way which can be described as rewriting the
program.
• There must also be an indefinite number of environments, and this is assured by
the fact that the evolving phenotypes are components of environments for their
own or other species.
• Further, some at least of the species in the evolving biosystem must have means
of dispersal, passive or active, which will bring them into contact with the new
environments (under these circumstances, other species may have the new en-
vironments brought to them). These environments will not only exert selective
pressure on the phenotypes, but will also act as items in programs, modifying the
epigenetic processes with which the Qs become worked out into QLs.
Tim Taylor (2004) implemented an experimental model called Cosmos that was designed to meet
the requirements of Waddington’s paradigm, however Taylor notes that “there were no coherent
theoretical reasons for deciding which features should be modelled [sic], and which should be left
out. This weakness is not specific to Cosmos, but is shared by all of the Tierra-like systems I have
come across.” Beyond his work on Waddington’s paradigm, Taylor (2012, 2015) identifies his own
set of minimal conditions for OEE. The conditions include:
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• Robustly reproductive individuals,
• A medium allowing the possible existence of a practically unlimited diversity of individuals
and interactions, at various levels of complexity,
• Individuals capable of producing more complex offspring,
• An evolutionary search space which typically offers mutational pathways from one viable
individual to other viable (and potentially fitter) individuals, and
• Drive for continued evolution.
The main drawback of both Waddington’s and Taylor’s paradigms is that they have never been em-
pirically validated. It is therefore difficult to make grounded claims about them beyond speculation.
That being said, it should be noted that there are similarities between the works of Waddington and
Taylor and the novel set of hypothesized conditions for OEE presented in the next chapter. The
existence of such similarities is not surprising given that scientists have been studying evolution
for centuries with moderate success; clearly something has been learned about open-ended evolu-
tion. However, as the next chapter will show, though some aspects of Waddinton’s and Taylor’s
conditions are similar to the conditions presented in this proposal, there are indeed substantial dif-
ferences that differentiate this work from its predecessors. Furthermore, the paradigm described in
the next chapter will be validated (in contrast to prior proposed sets of conditions) according to an
experimental methodology, which is described in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS
This chapter presents the main theoretical contribution of this dissertation: an empirically testable
set of necessary conditions for open-ended evolutionary domains.
It is important to first clarify what exactly is meant when a condition is deemed to be necessary.
In general, a necessary condition is a prerequisite for some outcome; the outcome cannot occur
if even one necessary condition is not satisfied. However, satisfying a necessary condition does
not guarantee that the outcome will occur. If satisfying some condition does in fact guarantee an
outcome, then that condition is said to be sufficient, not necessary, for that outcome. Note that
claiming sufficiency of any condition, or joint sufficiency of a set of conditions, would preclude
the future identification of additional conditions that are also necessary for the outcome (which in
this case is open-endedness). While the hypothesis in this dissertation is that the four conditions
described in this chapter are all necessary for open-ended evolution, whether they are sufficient is
left open. However, the hope is that the set of necessary and sufficient conditions can be kept as
small as possible.
At the same time, what is intentionally left out can be just as illuminating as what is included
(Lehman and Stanley, 2015). For example, one prominent omission from the four hypothesized
conditions is any reference to traditional fitness. While the fitness function is ubiquitous in much
of evolutionary computation (De Jong, 2006), any explicit conception of fitness, wherein some
individuals are destined to fail not as a function of the environment but due to selection only of top
performers, risks unnecessarily blocking potentially promising paths through the search space that
could otherwise support open-endedness.
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Hypothesized necessary conditions
It is important to note up front that a domain can only support open-ended evolution if it is suitable
to evolution in general. That is, any artificial or natural evolutionary system must satisfy certain
minimal prerequisites to have any success at all (open-ended or not). These prerequisites include
a good genetic representation (tightly coupled with the phenotype space) (De Jong, 2006), a suf-
ficiently large world for every individual to be evaluated, and some initial seed (like the first cell
on earth) or starting point (such as a random initial population) from which evolution begins. As-
suming that these general prerequisites are met, the main hypothesis is that the minimal necessary
conditions for open-ended evolution are as follows:
Condition 1: A rule should be enforced that individuals must meet some nontrivial minimal
criterion (MC) before they can reproduce.
Interestingly, in evolutionary computation, with a few exceptions (Lehman and Stanley, 2010),
most EAs implement no such MC: usually all individuals have at least some small probability of
reproduction (De Jong, 2006). The role of the MC in this case is to ensure that a minimal level
of complexity must always be maintained by every viable organism, thereby ensuring that the
population can never degenerate into trivial behaviors. On Earth, for example, individuals become
eligible to reproduce only by developing and maintaining functional reproductive apparatuses. No
lineage can persist that does not maintain this nontrivial capability, which is the MC on Earth. In
worlds that are unlike Earth, however, fundamentally different MC are conceivable; for example,
the criterion need not concern the mechanics of reproduction at all. That is, offspring could be
created by the system, as is common in evolutionary algorithms (EAs), without any reproductive
apparatus in the individuals themselves. There simply must be some meaningful limit on which
individuals can reproduce, thereby ensuring that the system will not degenerate into triviality. For
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example, every individual could be required to perform a particular task. To be nontrivial, the
criterion should involve interacting with the world in some way. An example of a trivial MC on
Earth might be requiring that individuals have green eyes to reproduce. In this case, the MC is
completely decoupled from behavior. If the MC is too arbitrary, the results of evolution will be
uninteresting. On the other hand, if it is too specific then the search will be too restricted.
This condition implies a necessary corollary: The initial seed (from which evolution begins) must
itself meet the MC and thereby be nontrivial enough to satisfy Condition 1. Otherwise, if evolution
began without any individuals who satisfy the MC, then no one would be allowed to reproduce and
the experiment would end. This corollary further diverges from traditional EAs (and even many
alife worlds), which often begin with a random population. If no individual in the initial population
of such an experiment meets a nontrivial MC then the algorithm could not satisfy Condition 1.
In fact, obtaining the starting seed (such as the first cell on Earth, which already began with a
reproductive apparatus) is a challenge in its own right that must be confronted for open-ended
evolution even to initiate.
Condition 2: The evolution of new individuals should create novel opportunities for satisfying
the MC.
If evolution is to sustain itself, then it must continually find paths from simpler phenotypes to
more complex ones. However, such novel paths will be explored only as long as each link in
the chain continues to satisfy the MC. Thus it is critical that new opportunities to satisfy the MC
through previously unsupportable strategies continually open up so that evolution can explore paths
that lead arbitrarily beyond the relatively simple initial seed. Furthermore, evolution itself is the
only viable generator of such novel opportunities because a human designer could not realistically
conceive a ladder of tasks sufficiently rich to continue without limit. The trajectory of biological
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evolution exhibits many such transitions where new life forms paved the way for further genetic
innovation in other lineages. Giraffes, for instance, could not have evolved on Earth before there
were trees. In this way, the evolution of trees created an opportunity for evolution later to explore
a previously unsupportable path (namely, the path to giraffes) by generating a novel opportunity to
satisfy the MC. If the nature of individual interactions is too restrictive (such as predators simply
bumping into prey in alife worlds), then this condition may not be possible to satisfy.
Condition 3: Decisions about how and where individuals interact with the world should be
made by the individuals themselves.
Such decisions determine whether an individual will successfully seek out and exploit novel op-
portunities for satisfying the MC. Though the MC primarily serves to maintain some degree of
complexity, it also creates a coupling between successful phenotypes and the environment. (This
coupling follows from the requirement that a nontrivial MC must involve interacting with the world
in some way, such as gathering food for sustenance of the reproductive apparatus in natural evo-
lution.) While this condition may initially sound unnecessary or unintuitive, recall that the rules
for behavior in artificial life worlds are practically unrestricted and often diverge from what we
are used to seeing on Earth. Thus there can (and do) exist systems where individuals are not com-
pletely autonomous and have some behaviors mediated by an external algorithmic mechanism.
However, if an individual cannot choose both its actions and their targets (geographical or other-
wise), then the environmental coupling is disrupted and phenotypic evaluation becomes arbitrary.
That is, if the individual does not play at least some role in deciding where it interacts, then some
kind of oracle would need to determine for the individual its best opportunity to satisfy the MC.
However, this oracle would require intimate knowledge of the search space to anticipate all possi-
ble future opportunities, most of which could not even exist when the search began. In this sense,
any decision made by such an oracle would be effectively arbitrary. Thus no human designer can
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realistically construct such an oracle. For these reasons, behavioral decisions must be made by
the individuals themselves, who thereby decide for themselves which opportunities to exploit (like
giraffes heading for the trees).
Condition 4: The potential size and complexity of the individuals’ phenotypes should be (in
principle) unbounded.
In practice, the growth of the phenotype must have some limit (e.g., the size of the universe in the
natural world); achieving infinite growth would of course require infinite time and infinite space.
However, at a practical level, the salient point is that the complexity of the phenotype should not
be limited by its representation, as there needs to be room for complexity to increase for the kind
of complexity explosion desired in open-ended evolution to be realized.
Note that there exist many definitions of “complexity” (Mitchell, 2009), just as there exist multiple
definitions of “open-ended evolution.” However, while different definitions of complexity might
change the way the proposed conditions in this dissertation are applied, given a particular defini-
tion or notion of complexity, the conditions serve as guidelines to institute open-endedness in the
service of that notion.
Differences from previous approaches
The hypothesized necessary conditions bear some similarity to the works of Waddington (1969)
and Taylor (2015), mentioned in Chapter 2. However, the idea that reproduction is achieved only
by satisfying some minimal criterion, and that all individuals meeting the MC are treated equally,
is a concept unseen in other OEE frameworks. The MC selects against badness, not for fitness.
This difference is subtle, yet contrasts with the explicitly competitive mindset that is ingrained in
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many artificial life worlds. It can be tempting to look for the why behind change, and to subscribe
to the philosophy that everything that persists serves some evolutionary purpose, but there is not
necessarily a causal mechanism beyond random mutations linking a parent to its offspring. Some
changes end up being for the better, some for the worse, and many end up being neutral. As long as
the bad is not bad enough to preclude reproduction (whether endogenous or externally managed),
the offspring was good enough. By introducing a mechanism that evaluates individuals without
judging them against each other, evolution can maintain nontriviality without compromising on
diversity. The benefits of search not driven by explicit objectives has been explored previously
in e.g. Lehman and Stanley (2011a). Of course, fitness is indeed an important concept in natural
evolution (Orr, 2009), but it can be viewed in the context of the hypothesized conditions as an
emergent byproduct of the MC in nature (i.e. to construct a copy of oneself) that changes over time
rather than an explicit a priori constraint imposed from outside. By thereby reducing the conditions
to rely solely upon the constraint of the MC instead of fitness, the simplest possible hypothesis on
the origin of open-ended dynamics can be explored, and fewer assumptions must be satisfied to
construct open-ended domains.
The work described in this dissertation is furthermore distinguished from its predecessors by pre-
senting clear, implementable requirements whose utility can also be empirically tested. To our
knowledge the tenets of Waddington’s paradigm have never been broken down and systematically
tested. In fact, Taylor (2004) notes that “little work has been devoted to exploring [Waddington’s]
proposal, presumably because of the difficulties in capturing it fully with an analytic model.” Tay-
lor’s own set of minimal criteria for OEE has similarly never been empirically tested. Again,
the idea is that, once validated, the conditions can be applied to other domains to determine their
susceptibility to unwanted convergence.
The next chapter describes a new artificial life world called Chromaria that implements the four
necessary conditions described in this chapter. This world will serve as the foundation for the
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empirical studies described in later chapters.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
This chapter first describes the artificial life world of Chromaria that is designed to test the con-
ditions introduced in the previous chapter, and then explains the experimental methodology for
performing those tests. Chromaria helps to illuminate the issues in open-endedness by providing a
highly visual interpretation of its dynamics. Furthermore, because open-endedness is challenging
both to achieve and to analyze formally, a number of novel approaches are introduced to facilitate
such analysis, including several new metrics inspired by recent discussion on the barriers to open
endedness by Dolson et al. (2015). The main contributions of this chapter then are a new artificial
life platform and a companion approach to analyzing its results.
Chromaria
As highlighted in the previous chapter, this dissertation describes the first scientific endeavor to
systematically test an OEE framework in an alife world. The world detailed in the rest of this
chapter, called Chromaria, was introduced in the ALIFE ’14 publication Identifying Minimal
Conditions for Open-Ended Evolution through the Artificial Life World of Chromaria (Soros and
Stanley, 2014) expressly for the purpose of testing the four proposed necessary conditions. First,
the nontraditional minimal criterion (MC) for reproduction in Chromaria is detailed, followed by
by a description of individuals’ genotypes and phenotypes. The ways in which Chromaria satisfies
the hypothesized necessary conditions will be explicitly pointed out along the way.
The colorful creatures (called Chromarians) evolved in Chromaria use artificial neural networks to
actively explore and search for a place to plant and thereby reproduce (figure 4.1). Each Chromar-
ian is allowed only one planting attempt. If the Chromarian’s RGB sensor field contents satisfy
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a specific planting function involving matching its color (detailed later), then the planting attempt
succeeds and the successful creature is eventually allowed to reproduce. Thus the MC in Chro-
maria, which is quite unlike Earth’s MC, is to navigate to a position in the world with colors
matching the Chromarian’s own coloring. If this MC is not met within a fixed amount of time,
then the Chromarian is removed without planting and does not reproduce. Thus Chromaria clearly
satisfies hypothesized Condition 1.
Figure 4.1: Chromaria. The first Chromarian is born at the center of the world and then must find
an appropriate place to plant. Each successive Chromarian is then born wherever its parent planted.
The color-rich borders initially provide the only viable options, but more emerge as Chromarians
continue to thrive in the environment (right).
Phenotypes and Genotypes
Each Chromarian’s morphology (equivalently its body, its phenotype) consists of a 2D image com-
posed of RGB pixels. The genotype that encodes this morphology is a compositional pattern
producing network (CPPN; Stanley 2007), a neural-network-like structure that generates patterns
with regularities seen in nature such as symmetry, repetition, and repetition with variation. Each
Chromarian’s genome actually contains two CPPNs: one that encodes its behavioral controller,
and another that encodes its morphology. A generic morphology-encoding CPPN and a sample
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decoded phenotype are shown in figure 4.2:
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Figure 4.2: Morphology-encoding CPPN and sample morphology. The CPPN encodes both the
outline and fill of the Chromarian’s morphology. Input b is a bias set to the constant value 1.0.
The morphology-encoding CPPN is decoded by passing a series of different input signals to it
and using the resulting outputs to draw the morphology pixel by pixel. The network is iteratively
activated with pairs of polar coordinates r and θ as input.1 Upon activation, the CPPN returns an
rmax for each value of θ, which determines how far the perimeter of the Chromarian’s body extends
at that angle. The other outputs are temporarily ignored. Then, the CPPN is activated again for
every r on the interior of this border to get the corresponding RGB values. In this way the CPPN
determines both the shape (via the rmax output) and internal color (via the RGB outputs) of the
Chromarian. These characteristics ultimately determine where the Chromarian can successfully
plant. Note that by evolving new morphological patterns and then becoming part of the world
in which other individuals plant, successful planters create novel opportunities for new kinds of
Chromarians to succeed and thereby satisfy the hypothesized Condition 2.
1 r is scaled from [0,49] to [0,1], and θ from [−Π,Π] to [-1,1].
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Each Chromarian is equipped with a rectangular visual field composed of 100 RGB sensors and
centered at the forefront of the Chromarian’s body. Half of the sensors fall underneath the body and
the rest extend in front of the creature. The exact resolution of the field depends on the creature’s
morphology; as its length and width increase, the distance between neighboring sensors grows.
Additionally, each Chromarian is equipped with a heading-sensitive compass consisting of 8 pie
slice sensors. All sensor values are scaled and then input to a multimodal neural controller (figure
4.3), the connection weights of which are encoded by the second CPPN.
B (10x10)  G (10x10)  R (10x10)  
RGB (10x10)  
L S R P
Heading  
Figure 4.3: Behavioral controller. The maximum number of connections in this network is
30,448. Arrows between planes in this schematic denote sets of connections between one plane
and another. Each plane represents a layer of neurons (also called nodes), with the bottom layer
corresponding to the RGB and compass sensors. The two types of sensor information remain
uncombined until the output layer is reached. The four output nodes control behavior.
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The output layer, which receives connections from the hidden layers, has four effector nodes cor-
responding to the Chromarian’s rotation (L and R), speed (S), and inclination to plant itself (P). If
the planting node value exceeds a certain threshold, the Chromarian is immobilized and it never
moves again. Otherwise, the rotation and speed nodes determine the Chromarian’s next movement.
Note that it is through this ability of the Chromarian to decide for itself when and where to plant
(based on its senses) that Chromaria satisfies Condition 3.
Evolutionary mechanisms
Evolution in Chromaria proceeds in two stages. First there is a preliminary search for an initial seed
that satisfies the MC (i.e. an individual that successfully plants itself), followed by the open-ended
phase (which proceeds without a particular desired behavior or morphology).
Novelty search
Satisfying the corollary to Condition 1 (that evolution must start with an initial seed that satis-
fies the MC) presents a puzzle: how can the initial seed be obtained? The proposed solution in
Chromaria is to begin with a preliminary search for it. This search for an initial seed is important
because it decides the starting point for subsequent open-ended evolution (and thereby influences
which potential paths to complexity evolution will explore). In the proposed experiment, novelty
search (Lehman and Stanley, 2011a) is the approach chosen to find a successful controller for the
initial morphology (which was generated through a separate process called interactive evolution).
As mentioned in Chapter 2, novelty search replaces the fitness function found in traditional evo-
lutionary algorithms with a novelty metric, which measures how different an individual is from
those that have previously been found. This approach has been shown sometimes to avoid decep-
tion (Lehman and Stanley, 2011a) and to produce a better representation (Woolley and Stanley,
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2011) than traditional objective-based fitness. Novelty calculations in this preliminary search are
based on the individual’s (x,y) position and planting attempts (indicated by a binary value) mea-
sured at every fifth tick of the trial. Novelty search, and hence the preliminary search, succeeds
when it finds an individual that successfully plants itself. Planters discovered by novelty search for
particular morphologies can then be used as seeds in the open-ended main evolutionary phase.
Open-ended evolution
Once an initial seed has been selected, evolution is governed by an entirely new algorithm. In
the unconventional main loop in Chromaria, the Chromarians that have successfully planted most
recently are kept in a parent queue capped at 100 individuals. When the simulation begins, the
parent queue only contains one Chromarian (i.e. the initial seed found in the preliminary search).
That initial seed individual then attempts to plant. Each tick of the simulation (capped at 200 ticks
per Chromarian) proceeds as follows:
1. The Chromarian’s sensors are updated and its controller is activated.
2. If the planting effector node is negative, the Chromarian moves according to its other effec-
tor nodes. Otherwise, the Chromarian attempts to plant at its current location. This attempt
succeeds if the the RGB ratios in the Chromarian’s morphology are collectively no greater
than 12.5% different from the RGB ratios in its sensor array contents (figure 4.4). Further-
more, to ensure that Chromarians must learn to move (to keep the MC nontrivial), they are
eliminated if they attempt to plant within a small radius of their starting position (wherever
their parent planted).
3. If the planting attempt succeeds, the Chromarian generates an offspring. Note that reproduc-
tive dynamics in Chromaria are unlike those in many other alife worlds. The next Chromar-
ian to reproduce is always next in the parent queue, indicated by a current parent pointer. If
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the current parent is at the end of the queue, the pointer simply wraps back to the start of the
queue. In this way, all Chromarians who successfully plant eventually get to reproduce. That
is, explicit competition, which is usually central to alife worlds, is intentionally absent from
Chromaria (because it still satisfies the four conditions anyway). As soon as an offspring is
created from the current parent, it attempts to plant, starting near its parent’s location. If it
succeeds, then it is inserted into the parent queue directly preceding its own parent. Then the
next Chromarian in the queue reproduces, and so on. This mechanism of always inserting
offspring preceding their parent forces the system to allow every preexisting member of the
population to reproduce before a newcomer.
4. Whenever a new Chromarian succeeds at planting, the oldest preexisting member is removed
from the population list if the list contains at least 100 members. However, all bodies of
previously successful planters remain in the world for the duration of evolution.
Figure 4.4: RGB ratio calculation. Each pixel of both the morphology and sensor field is placed
into one of eight bins: black, white, red, green, blue, yellow, cyan, or magenta. Here, a simple
morphology is shown to the left of its binned equivalent. The bins are defined by halving the
ranges [0,255] that the R, G, and B component values can take. For instance, any pixel with R∈[0,
255
2
] (more non-red than red), G∈[0,255
2
] (more non-green than green), and B∈[0,255
2
] (more non-
blue than blue) falls into the black bin because black has values R,G,B = 0,0,0. Once every pixel
is binned in this way, color ratios are calculated for each bin by dividing the bin size by the total
number of pixels. Ratios are recorded for both the morphology and sensor field. The differences
between these ratios for each color are summed to get a matching value. If this value is less than 1
(out of 8), the planting function is satisfied.
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CPPNs are evolved using HyperNEAT (Stanley et al., 2009), a neuroevolution method that gradu-
ally complexifies its underlying genetic representation over time. HyperNEAT’s ability to evolve
multimodal neural networks with tens of thousands of connections is what enables creating an ar-
tificial life world like Chromaria, where autonomous control decisions are made based on rich sen-
sory input. Through the indirect CPPN encoding, HyperNEAT can efficiently evolve complex con-
nectivity patterns that reflect the geometry of their inputs. The large HyperNEAT substrate neural
networks (up to 30,448 connections) in this experiment provide sufficient space for complexity to
increase significantly over the course of a run, thereby satisfying Condition 4. The current version
of Chromaria uses a modified version of the HyperSharpNEAT 2.1 implementation of HyperNEAT,
which is based on Colin Green’s SharpNEAT (Green, 2006). Parameter settings are included with
the released code, available at http://eplex.cs.ucf.edu/chromaria/home .
As demonstrated in this chapter, Chromaria satisfies the four hypothesized necessary conditions
for open-ended evolution: (1) individuals must satisfy a nontrivial MC (finding a valid location in
which to plant) before they can reproduce; (2) individuals can create novel opportunities for sat-
isfying the MC by planting and becoming part of the world; (3) individuals decide for themselves
where and when to plant based on information from their sensors; and (4) the CPPN encodings for
the creatures’ morphologies and controllers have no complexity ceiling; thus complexity has room
to increase significantly.
The next section details preliminary experiments with Chromaria. These experiments demonstrate
the utility of Chromaria for empirical testing.
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Preliminary Work
In the introductory publication (Soros and Stanley, 2014), one of the four hypothesized necessary
conditions was tested through a controlled experiment to show how the artificial life world can
serve as a testbed for further investigations. This previously-published experiment is described
in this chapter both to give some intuition about what happens in Chromaria after a significant
amount of time has passed and to preview the methodology for the experiments described in this
dissertation. Note that the methodology is expanded for the dissertation experiments and will be
described in more detail at the end of this chapter.
Experiment
In this initial experiment, the second condition (that the evolution of new individuals should create
novel opportunities for satisfying the minimal criterion) is controlled by preventing Chromarians
from sensing each other. That way, individuals’ decisions about where to try and plant would
only be based on the initial environment and thus new opportunities to plant could never arise
beyond those provided by the initial colored border region and white background. Note that in
these experiments, unlike in the dissertation experiments described in Chapters 5 through 8, each
Chromarian is born at the center of the world regardless of where its parent planted. Five runs
each of the control and standard (i.e. satisfying all four conditions) versions of Chromaria were
performed, starting from the same initial seed (discovered by novelty search to plant in a magenta
and blue border region) and ending after 50,000 reproductions. Additionally, a second set of
five control and five standard runs was initiated from a different initial seed. The goal of this
preliminary experiment was to observe the continual production of novel and successful planters
in the unaltered version of Chromaria, and to show that such continued innovation (hinting at
open-ended evolution) is precluded when Condition 2 goes unmet.
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Figure 4.5: Representative standard world snapshots. The standard version of Chromaria was
run through 50,000 reproductions using two different initial seeds (one magenta and one blue).
Here, representative standard worlds are shown at various reproduction numbers. While each run
followed a different trajectory, every standard run exhibited principled growth beyond the initial
world state.
Results
A key benefit of the visual design of Chromaria is that observing the implications of different
variants is easy even before descriptive statistics are calculated.
The world states shown in figure 4.5 illustrate a clear expansion and diversification (both in terms
of planting locations and colors) of the population, which was observed in every standard run but
absent from the control runs. Furthermore, distinct color-behavioral groups can be seen gradually
emerging and unfolding over the 50,000 reproduction attempts of each world. Importantly, ap-
preciating the full breadth of Chromaria requires observing Chromarians in action (i.e. exploring
and attempting to plant) because much of the complexity of evolved Chromarians is in their dy-
namic behavior, which is based on their rich sensory inputs. For that purpose highlight videos are
available at http://eplex.cs.ucf.edu/chromaria/home.
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Another intriguing result was that even though the world is stochastic, the end states among the
standard runs exhibit some consistent dynamics (an outcome that could not necessarily be pre-
dicted from the start). As shown in figure 4.6, the magenta worlds results consistently in ringlike
configurations.
Figure 4.6: Typical standard run end states. At 50,000 reproductions, standard runs in the
magenta world typically exhibit circular patterns of growth. However, while such patterns are
discernible, differences in the individual snapshots indicate unique trends in individual runs.
To quantify the dramatic difference Condition 2 makes, the diversity of behaviors generated in
different variants was measured. For the purpose of sampling the variance of behaviors, position is
sampled ten times (at every 20 simulation ticks), giving a vector of length 20 for each individual.
The path of an individual Chromarian is represented as a vector of (x, y) coordinates with range
[(0, 0), (1000, 1000)]. The breadth of behavioral trajectories in a run can then be characterized by
calculating the average variance in position (var) at each sampled tick. It is important to note
that these behaviors (represented by the vector of all sampled positions) capture both a period of
intelligent seeking and then planting once a suitable color destination is identified. Given that
successful planting is a nontrivial behavior, this metric captures not just the amount of diversity
produced by evolution, but the amount of interesting or nontrivial diversity. In the blue world, the
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average var is 379.8 (with its own across-runs standard deviation ar-σ = 96.4) for control runs
and 1,272.9 (ar-σ = 465.4) for standard. In the magenta world, the average var is 625.31 (ar-
σ = 114.8) for control runs and 1579.40 (ar-σ = 123.8) for standard. In both worlds, the p-value
from a Student’s t-test is under 0.05, indicating statistical significance. Thus the quantitative results
match the intuition that a significantly wider breadth of intelligent planting behaviors results when
Condition 2 is met.
The next section describes how the preliminary experiments will be expanded for the main exper-
iments.
Main Experiment Setup
The experiment detailed in the previous chapter demonstrates an initial methodology for testing
one of the hypothesized necessary conditions. The approach in this dissertation is to control and
evaluate all four conditions using more comprehensive metrics.
It should be noted that a new mechanism for determining a new Chromarian’s birth location was
implemented for the dissertation experiments to avoid the circular growth patterns shown in Figure
4.6. In this new version of the world, each new Chromarian is born within a fixed radius of its par-
ent. This mechanism is both more consistent with nature and less likely to unintentionally produce
phenomena such as the inescapable black ring observed in many of the preliminary experiments.
The next sections describe the controls for the four hypothesized necessary conditions and then
detail metrics (expanded from the preliminary experiments) for quantifying the relevant aspects of
open-endedness.
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Experimental controls
Each control is described in this section after its corresponding condition is reviewed.
Condition 1: A rule should be enforced that individuals must meet some minimal criterion (MC)
before they can reproduce, and that criterion must be nontrivial. Control: All individuals are
allowed to reproduce regardless of what they do in the world.
Condition 2: The evolution of new individuals should create novel opportunities for satisfying
the MC. Control: Individuals cannot see each other, which means that the evolution of new in-
dividuals has no impact on other individuals in the world. Note that this control was already
demonstrated in short preliminary experiments by Soros and Stanley (2014), as described earlier
in this chapter. Longer experiments with more comprehensive metrics are described in Chapter 7
of this dissertation.
Condition 3: Decisions about how and where individuals interact with the world should be made
by the individuals themselves. Control: Randomness is introduced into Chromarian interaction
and reproduction via a two-step process. First, each new Chromarian is born in a random location
within a fixed radius of its parent (instead of at the center of the world). The new Chromarian is
then given a random heading. This way, the individual’s planting location is determined entirely
by a combination of chance and parent location. Interestingly, this offspring placement scheme is
reminiscent of the default rules in the Avida system (Ofria and Wilke, 2004). To completely remove
the neural network from Chromarian behavior, each new Chromarian is forced to attempt to plant
once its location and heading are determined (instead of having the neural network determine
whether or not a Chromarian should plant during its lifetime). Reproduction is still dependent on
satisfying the standard color matching function described earlier in this chapter.
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Condition 4: The potential size and complexity of the individuals’ phenotypes should be (in
principle) unbounded. Control: This condition is controlled by setting an upper limit on the
number of nodes and connections allowed in each individual’s genome network (i.e. its CPPN),
which in effect limits phenotypic complexity.
Metrics
As discussed in Chapter 2, the question of how to define and quantify open-endedness is con-
tentious. There is a reasonable position that the phenomenon is related to the continual production
of novelty (Bedau et al., 1997; Lehman and Stanley, 2011a; Nellis, 2012; Standish, 2003), but
measuring novelty with respect to what is still a question without a universally satisfying answer.
In an attempt to work around this issue, Dolson et al. (2015) propose that instead of trying to
quantitatively define what an open-ended system is, perhaps it would be more productive to start
with what an open-ended system is not (much in the spirit of the experiments described in this
dissertation). To this end, Dolson et al. suggest five barriers to open-endedness that describe
negative outcomes for evolutionary processes. These barriers are illustrated through five accounts
of unproductive evolution (quoted verbatim from Dolson et al. (2015)):
Change barrier: The population stops changing at all after a certain point: As is often
the case in genetic algorithms, the population may converge to a local optimum and
never leave.
Novelty barrier: Novel organisms stop appearing in the population: Perhaps the pop-
ulation doesn’t completely converge, but instead oscillates among a set of survival
strategies.
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Complexity barrier: Organismal complexity stops increasing: The organisms hit a
limit on the amount of environmental information that they can incorporate into their
genomes, preventing them from producing more sophisticated behaviors.
Ecological barrier: Ecosystem diversity stagnates: The population as a whole hits a
limit on the sum total of information about the environment that it is able to incorporate
across genomes. Note that other organisms are part of the environment that any given
organism experiences, so this effectively amounts to organisms creating new niches
and trophic levels via their interactions with other organisms.
Transition barrier: Shifts in individuality are impossible. In nature, major transitions
in evolution often change what it means to be an individual – the most profound ex-
ample being the transition to multicellularity. Systems that pre-define what it means
to be an individual fundamentally limit the types of evolution possible; theoretically
an open-ended system should be able to undergo any number of such shifts.
The position advocated in this dissertation, and supported by the framework of Dolson et al. (2015),
is that there is likely not just one key dimension of novelty or open-endedness; many factors con-
tribute to a system’s evolutionary dynamics. Thus the approach in this dissertation is to paint a
broad picture of evolution by collecting a variety of quantitative and qualitative data points that
speak to the barriers described by Dolson et al. (2015). Each metric is described as it is imple-
mented in Chromaria. Additionally, metrics are described in the order they will be presented in the
successive results chapters.
Visual snapshots
This metric illuminates environmental change and the ability of the system to overcome the ecolog-
ical barrier. Recall that successful planters leave their bodies on the topmost layer of the world,
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rendering the previous planters underneath invisible. Then, by taking visual snapshots of the world
and observing the amount of change between successive snapshots, we can infer fairly easily how
much the environment (which determines what species can interact) is changing.
Metric 1: Genome network size
The aim of this metric is to indicate the system’s tendency to avoid the complexity barrier. At the
genome level, complexity can be approximated by measuring the number of nodes and connec-
tions in each individual’s CPPNs. Once the CPPNs are decoded, the resulting phenotypes (each
a morphology coupled with a behavioral controller) must be assessed independently. Genomic
complexity is a good proxy for organismal complexity because the size of the genome represents
a theoretical cap on the complexity of the organism, and CPPNs gradually increase in size through
NEAT (the neuroevolution algorithm in Chromaria).
Metric 2: Median reproduction number of last new species’ emergence
The frequency at which new individuals appear directly measures the system’s tendency to avoid
the change barrier and novelty barrier by showing that the population has not converged to a
single fixed point. Such nonconvergence is guaranteed if new species continue to emerge in the
system. The species of an individual is determined by comparing its morphology color ratios with
the color ratios of representatives of all previous species. If two individuals’ ratios satisfy the
planting function described in Figure 4.4, these individuals are considered to be members of the
same species. If an offspring is determined to belong to a novel species (i.e. the planting function
is not satisfied when comparing its morphology to the morphology of any previously found species
representative), then it becomes the representative for a new species. This metric tracks the last
occurrence of new species’ emergence.
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Metric 3: Median total species count
The total number of unique species that emerge during a run quantify how much of the morpholog-
ical search space is explored during a run. While this metric does not necessarily map to a specific
barrier to OEE, it quantifies the degree of generativity of a system.
Metric 4: Planting attempt success rate
This metric, considered in tandem with with the time of last species emergence and total species
count, helps create a holistic quantification of the system’s evolutionary dynamics. Specifically, it
can potentially quantify how difficult it is to satisfy the MC throughout a run. If the planting attempt
success rates drops to an unusually low level, it can also indicate a pathology in the system.
The transition barrier is not analyzed here because this work is not designed to illuminate evo-
lutionary shifts in individuality. A domain can arguably still be open-ended even without them
because exhausting the space that contains just one type of individual could still consume infinite
time.
One final issue that has not yet been addressed is how long to perform the proposed experimental
runs. The concept of open-endedness poses a challenge because it suggests that an evolutionary
process that runs for only a finite amount of time is not genuinely open-ended. However, to study
the phenomenon scientifically, we must be able to run repeatable experiments. To repeat an exper-
iment, it must definitively end. The question then is, given that forever is infeasible, how long is
long enough?
To address this question, 500,000 reproductions is the chosen run length for the proposed experi-
ments. This number follows the methodology of the experiments on long-term evolution by Pugh
et al. (2015). Though the evolutionary mechanisms are not exactly the same, the domain in those
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experiments is intentionally designed to allow a variety of ways to succeed and as such is philo-
sophically similar to the domain of the experiments described in this proposal. The experiments
conducted by Pugh et al. (2015) were run until the population seemed to converge, which occurred
by 250,000 reproductions in most cases.
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CHAPTER 5: STANDARD RUN RESULTS
The primary purpose of running experiments in a world that satisfies all of the conditions hypothe-
sized to be necessary for OEE (i.e. the standard runs) is to establish a baseline for comparison with
the control worlds (wherein one of the conditions is not satisfied in the world). Visual snapshots
are presented first in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 to provide an intuition for the evolutionary trajectories of
each of these runs. Note that each row in each of these figures contains evenly spaced snapshots
of a single run. Additionally, visual snapshots from a single sample run are presented in Figures
5.3 and 5.4 to give a more fine-grained sense of the evolutionary trajectories that are observed in
this world. Quantitative results will be presented following the visual snapshots, followed by a
general discussion of these qualitative and quantitative results. A more comprehensive discussion
of open-endedness in Chromaria is deferred to the synthesis chapter so that a full comparison to
the control experiment results is possible.
One unexpected outcome is that genome size actually decreases over time (Figure 5.5). How-
ever, this result does not necessarily indicate a lack of open-endedness in Chromaria, or even that
individuals are not themselves becoming more complex over time. In fact, complex behavioral
patterns can be observed at the ends of runs and in fact navigating the world (which becomes more
complex over time as a greater variety of Chromarians embed themselves in it) arguably requires
more complex behavior than simply moving forward and planting when pink patches are found
(which is the behavior displayed by the initial seed Chromarian evolved through novelty search).
The conclusion is that the fact that controller genome size generally decreases suggests that the
genetic encoding in Chromaria (e.g. CPPNs) is sufficiently expressive that capping genome size
would not have an impact on the complexity of observed behaviors.
That is, given a sufficiently high-dimensional representation, an evolving population can in princi-
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ple increase in complexity until the full capacity of that representation is exhausted. Because we
do not know how long it may take to reach that capacity, any finite-length experiment may exhibit
increasing complexity (according to any measure) throughout a run even with a fixed-capacity rep-
resentation. While it is true that theoretically the size of the representation would still need to
expand, we cannot know with certainty when (i.e. at what iteration) the need for such expansion
would arise. The result that the standard runs do not exhibit measurable increases in complexity
therefore does not indicate on its own a deficit in open-ended dynamics. Rather, it points to the
fact that even though in theory representation should be unbounded for the purpose of open-ended
experiments, in practice it may prove unnecessary in cases where the amount of time it would take
to reach a complexity cap is far longer than the time and computation available to complete the ex-
periment. In this way, this result may inform future thinking about experiments in open-endedness,
by hinting that fixed-length representation are least eligible for consideration for finite-length ex-
periments if their capacity is sufficiently high.
Our intuition that a reasonably open-ended world should not be completely predictable appears
satisfied; there is an observable diversity in terms of end states among the various runs depicted in
Figures 5.1 and 5.2. (As will be discussed shortly, the control runs will not display such a wide
diversity of outcomes.) It is not obvious at the beginning, or even the middle, of these runs what
the world will look like at 500,000 reproductions (when the experiments are stopped). Even then,
looking at any individual run it is hard to predict with any confidence what the world would look
like at 1,000,000 reproductions. Would it stay the same, or would it look completely different?
Whether or not Chromaria is indeed open-ended (which is a question that will be addressed after
discussing the results of the control experiments), this world at least informs our analysis by giving
us a sense of what is “normal” in this unique world.
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Figure 5.1: Standard run visual snapshots. Snapshots are taken at 125,000, 250,000, 375,000,
and 500,000 reproductions. Each row contains snapshots from a single run.
43
Figure 5.2: Further standard run visual snapshots (one run per row) continued from Figure 5.1
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Figure 5.3: Visual snapshots from a single standard run at 125,000, 250,000, and 375,000 repro-
ductions. These snapshots illustrate the variety and complexity of individual Chromarians.
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Figure 5.4: Visual snapshots from the single standard run shown in Figure 5.3 at reproductions
416,500, 458,250, and 500,000. The formation of niches is observed in these later stages of this
particular run and a variety of morphology types can be seen in the bottommost snapshot.
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(a) Controller neurons (b) Controller connections
(c) Morphology neurons (d) Morphology connections
Figure 5.5: Genome network size in standard runs. The second and third quartiles of each
dataset are represented by a colored box with a line in the middle indicating the median, while
the first and fourth quartiles are denoted by lines above and below the colored box. Dots above or
below these lines indicate outliers. Note that the genomes themselves are CPPNs with distinct neu-
ron and connection counts. The average averages reported correspond to the average counts over
the last 250 individuals in a run averaged over 20 runs. Interestingly, the number of connections
in controller genomes decreases over time. This result initially seems counterintuitive; genomes
generally become larger, not smaller, over the course of evolution. However, this result does not
necessarily indicate that genome complexity itself is decreasing because genome size (particularly
with an indirect encoding) does not strictly map to genome complexity. Instead, this result sug-
gests that the genetic encoding in Chromaria is sufficiently expressive to encode neural networks
capable of generating complex behaviors even at small genome sizes.
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CHAPTER 6: CONTROL 1 (NO MINIMAL CRITERION) RESULTS
Novelty search (Lehman and Stanley, 2011a) and other related algorithms such as its minimal crite-
rion variant (Lehman and Stanley, 2010) showed that there are viable alternatives to the traditional
paradigm of objective-based optimization or “survival of the fittest”. Still, novelty search is not
like evolution on Earth, and few would claim that evolution on Earth explicitly rewards individuals
simply for being different. (In fact, many creatures on Earth would not be able to reproduce with-
out there existing other individuals of the same species, which is not true for robots evolving to
solve the Hard Maze of novelty search.) Then, there is still a need to arrive at a minimal conception
of evolution that escapes the objective-based paradigm. One of the goals of this experiment is to
see how much of evolution’s ability to innovate can be explained by simple evolutionary drift (i.e.
mutation-driven diffusion throughout the search space). Condition 1 tests the importance of the
minimal criterion to controlling such drift:
Condition 1: A rule should be enforced that individuals must meet some minimal criterion (MC)
before they can reproduce, and that criterion must be nontrivial. Control: All individuals are
allowed to reproduce regardless of what they do in the world.
If evolution continues to innovate in a meaningful way (i.e. still produces new kinds of things
that aren’t completely degenerate or random) even without enforcing a minimal criterion, then
we might conclude that drift is sufficient to enable open-ended evolution. On the other hand, if
evolution did fail to produce new kinds of novelty and complexity, we would conclude that some
nontrivial minimal criterion is indeed necessary to sustain open-ended evolution.
Figure 6.6 reveals a dramatic phenomenon that planting rates drop off completely before the runs
are even halfway complete. In fact, the time at which the last species emerges, on average, is near
the beginning of the run (at least compared to the standard runs; Figure 6.4). Most significantly,
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the fact that visual snapshots of the world (Figures 6.1 and 6.2) look identical to each other indicate
that no Chromarian even attempts to plant, as any planting attempt whatsoever would succeed and
thereby cause a new morphology to become embedded in the world. The cause of this outcome
can be understood by observing the behaviors of individuals in the world as planting rates begin to
decline. Whereas behaviors demonstrate some semblance of intelligence (such as edge following
and generally reacting to environmental stimuli) in the earlier stages of the runs, late stage Chro-
marians have reverted to simply running into walls repeatedly. Others do not move at all. These
results suggest that without an MC enforcing some minimal level of complexity, there is no pres-
sure causing individuals to attempt to plant. Evolutionary innovations seem susceptible to a “use
it or lose it” mechanism.
It is also interesting to note that a significantly higher (than standard) median number of species
emerge in this world (Figure 6.5; p=5.52 × 10−8)1, and that the last species to emerge does so
significantly earlier on in these runs (Figure 6.4; p=6.29× 10−8). These results together suggest a
rapid initial proliferation of disparate forms followed by a steep descent into chaos. Additionally,
this world contains little of the organic-seeming clusters and cohesion present in the standard
version of the world (Figures 6.1 and 6.2).
Generally, this experiment supports two conclusions: (1) that a minimal criterion is indeed neces-
sary for open-endedness, and (2) that the minimal criterion offers a viable alternative to a traditional
fitness-based gradient.
It is also instructive to consider the results of this experiment with respect to Dolson’s barriers to
OEE. The inability of any new individuals to reproduce indicates that the system eventually runs
into the change barrier (when the population stops changing at all), which is conceived as the most
elementary obstacle to open-endedness.
1Controls in this and future chapters are compared to the Standard world using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
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Figure 6.1: Control 1 visual snapshots. Individuals do not have to satisfy any minimal criterion
to reproduce. Snapshots are taken at 25,000, 62,500, 125,000, and 162,500 reproductions. Each
row depicts a single run.
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Figure 6.2: Additional Control 1 visual snapshots (one run on each row) continued from Figure
6.1
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(a) Controller neurons (b) Controller connections
(c) Morphology neurons (d) Morphology connections
Figure 6.3: Genome network size, Control 1. The average averages reported correspond to the
average counts over the last 250 individuals in a run averaged over 20 runs.
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Figure 6.4: Median last new species, Control 1. The last new species emerges at reproduction
44,000 out of 500,000. In contrast, the last new species in the standard world emerges at repro-
duction 330,750. This result indicates that evolution stops generating anything novel significantly
earlier (compared to the standard world; p=6.29× 10−8) in the runs. Without a minimal criterion,
evolution in Chromaria fails to overcome the change and novelty barriers.
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Figure 6.5: Median total species, Control 1. In this world, individuals that attempt to plant are
guaranteed to succeed regardless of how closely their morphologies match the world they inhabit.
Removing the minimal criterion results in a significantly higher total number of species (22) than
in the standard runs (16; p=5.52×10−8) because individuals that would normally fail to satisfy the
morphological matching function in the standard are completely viable in this control world. As a
result, evolutionary search is able to traverse more of the morphology space.
54
Figure 6.6: Median successful planting attempts, Control 1. While initially the lack of minimal
criterion allows normally nonviable individuals to succeed, and as a result allows many new species
to emerge, the rate of planting attempt successes strictly decreases over time. While this result may
initially seem counterintuitive given that every planting attempt in this control is guaranteed to
succeed, it is explained by the conclusion that planting attempts themselves are actually declining
and eventually becoming nonexistent.
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CHAPTER 7: CONTROL 2 (NO INTERACTIONS) RESULTS
The existence of an individual can permanently change the environment that other creatures (of
the same type and of different types) inhabit. The changes to the world that one individual makes
can make possible further changes to the world by another individual in the future. As an example,
consider the fact that many humans today, at least in the West, rely either directly or indirectly on
fossil fuels to enable our day-to-day lives. The existence of prehistoric creatures (along with many
other evolutionary events) thus created an opportunity for modern humans to live the way we do.
The set of experiments in this chapter explores the impacts of interactions between individuals on
evolutionary dynamics.
Condition 2: The evolution of new individuals should create novel opportunities for satisfying the
MC. Control: Individuals cannot see each other (and therefore cannot interact), which means that
the evolution of new individuals has no impact on other individuals in the world.
Individuals that satsify the MC (of reproduction) in the same way are said to belong to the same
species. That way, a world where novel opportunities for satisfying the MC are either few in
number or hard to take advantage of would almost certainly see the emergence of fewer species.
In a world where individuals cannot see each other, we would expect that new innovations could
not be exploited.
It is clear that something about Earth and about the standard version of Chromaria yield novel op-
portunities for satisfying the MC and that individuals are able to take advantage of them, resulting
in the emergence of new species over time. If evolution continues to innovate in this modified
version of Chromaria despite the fact that individuals are not affected by the innovations of other
individuals, then something else would have to be creating novel opportunities for satisfying the
MC.
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A preliminary suite of experiments described in Chapter 4 provided some initial insights into the
ramifications of this control. These results, from a slightly different version of Chromaria wherein
all new Chromarians are born in the center of the world, suggested that indeed new species fail to
emerge when evolutionary innovations cannot build on each other. The comprehensive experiments
in this chapter are performed on a longer timescale than the previous experiments. An important
question, then, is about what phenomena would be expected in this world given more time.
Morphologies that are primarily white might evolve as a result of random mutation and manage to
plant in the white center of the world. More evolutionary time (which results in more reproduc-
tions and, accordingly, more mutations) could increase the chances of such an innovation occur-
ring. However, due to the constraints imposed on this special (control) version of the world, it is
impossible for creatures to ever plant based on pixels that are not present in the world at repro-
duction 0. Additional colors do not become available to future Chromarians no matter how much
time passes. The chance of at some point evolving (by mutation) an individual capable of planting
based on those initial colors may potentially increase with time. However, there is no reason to
believe that more time will otherwise lead to increased evolutionary innovation in this version of
the world because no new opportunities are emerging.
The world depicted in visual snapshots is akin to a world of ghosts; the bodies of dead Chromarians
are not visible to the living Chromarians. However, the parent queue is very much alive, and a
creature that succeeds at planting in this world (which has not changed since the beginning of
time) will generate an offspring as usual.
Looking at these worlds visually reveals stark homogeneity (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). This observed
homogeneity is also reflected quantitatively in the significantly decreased number of total species
that emerge over the course of runs in this world compared to the standard world (Figure 7.5;
p=5.77 × 10−8). Additionally, species emergence in general tapers off twice as fast as it does in
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the standard world (Figure 7.4; p=6.29 × 10−8). Though planting rates are high (Figure 7.6), this
effectively guaranteed success comes at the expense of diversity and innovation.
The impact that one individual, or one evolutionary innovation, can have on the system as a whole
is limited. It is only through the combined and often complex interactions among many evolution-
ary innovations (such as new types of individuals) that higher levels of novelty and complexity
become accessible to evolutionary search. Without the ability to build off of prior innovations,
such a search is restricted to a narrow radius of its starting point. The results from this experiment
support the conclusion that interaction between individuals indeed is necessary for open-ended
evolution.
Regarding Dolson’s barriers to OEE (Dolson et al., 2015), it is impossible to overcome the change
and novelty barriers (which both require the emergence of new kind of individuals) when new
kinds of individuals are not able to thrive. A small number of runs seem more able, by chance,
to to better overcome these barriers by evolving (via mutation) primarily white individuals with a
splash of color. However, the space of viable individuals in this world is fundamentally limited
to those primarily composed of pink, purple, and white pixels because these colors are readily
available in thee “ground” world that is always accessible. As a result, the world would not be
expected ever to display a significant amount of novelty in the long run.
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Figure 7.1: Control 2 visual snapshots. Individuals in this world cannot see each other and
thus cannot take advantage of evolutionary innovations. Snapshots are taken at 125,000, 250,000,
375,000, and 500,000 reproductions. Each row contains snapshots from a single run.
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Figure 7.2: Control 2 visual snapshots (one run in each row) continued from Figure 7.1
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(a) Controller neurons (b) Controller connections
(c) Morphology neurons (d) Morphology connections
Figure 7.3: Genome network size, Control 2. The average averages reported correspond to the
average counts over the last 250 individuals in a run averaged over 20 runs. Neuron counts in
controller-encoding genome networks stay approximately the same over the course of each run,
while the connection count decreases. These results obey the same general patterns as the standard
runs, but the decrease in connection count is not as dramatic in this control. However, both neuron
and connection counts increase for morphology-encoding genomes in these control runs.
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Figure 7.4: Median last new species reproduction number, Control 2. The last species in this
world emerges significantly earlier, at median reproduction 171,000, when individuals can’t see or
interact with each other, compared to reproduction 330,750 in the standard world (p=6.29× 10−8).
It is clear from observing the visual snapshots that it is difficult, if not impossible, for evolution to
traverse morphology space beyond the colors present in the initial state of the world. Thus, this
result provides evidence that Chromaria fails to overcome the novelty and change barriers in this
case.
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Figure 7.5: Median total species count, Control 2. The inability for evolution to access most
areas of morphology space is again evidenced by the significantly lower number of total species
found (7) compared to the standard world (16; p=5.77× 10−8). This low total species count com-
bined with the relatively early emergence of the last new species indicates that evolution exhausts
all available opportunities for innovation early on and then fails to discover or take advantage of
new ones.
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Figure 7.6: Median successful planting attempts, Control 2. Planting attempt success rates
are lower when individuals cannot interact with each other compared to in the standard world.
Interestingly, the planting success rate at the end of the run in the control world is approximately
the success rate at the beginning of the standard runs. Given that morphology-encoding genomes
tended to increase in size in this world, it is possible that morphological complexity is potentially
at least a partial contributor to this result because the colored background that provides the only
opportunity for planting does not itself become more complex.
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CHAPTER 8: CONTROL 3 (NO NEURAL NETWORKS) RESULTS
Artificial life worlds take many forms, from cellular automata to worlds with fully embodied
agents. The purpose of this particular experiment more broadly is to understand the role that
agency and individuality play in evolution. The planting scheme in this world is inspired by the
approach to reproduction in the popular alife platform Avida (Ofria and Wilke, 2004). (As a re-
minder, digital organisms in Avida exist on a two-dimensional grid and when an offspring is born
it is placed randomly in one of the cells adjacent to its parent.)
Condition 3: Decisions about how and where individuals interact with the world should be made
by the individuals themselves. Control: Randomness is introduced into Chromarian interaction
and reproduction via a two step process. First, each new Chromarian is born in a random location
within a fixed radius of its parent. The new Chromarian is then given a random heading. This
way, the individual’s planting location is determined entirely by a combination of chance and
parent location. To completely remove the neural network from Chromarian behavior, each new
Chromarian is forced to attempt to plant once its location and heading are chosen by the system
(instead of having the neural network determine whether or not a Chromarian should plant during
its lifetime). Reproduction is still dependent on satisfying the standard color matching function
described in Chapter 4.
If it turns out that evolution is not as productive as in the standard word, then there would be
evidence supporting the position that the self-chosen actions of individuals play an important role
in open-ended evolution. There would also be reason to believe that certain classes of alife systems
can be predicted to be fundamentally limited in their potential for open-endedness.
These worlds appear to be more homogeneous than standard Chromaria in terms of color com-
position (Figures 8.1, 8.2, 8.3); in this world, having a morphology with 50% black pixels seems
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to become a requirement for success when the neural networks are removed. It is possible that
black pixels, which occupy a special place at the extreme of the RGB color space (which is impor-
tant to reproductive success in Chromaria), are a mechanism for coping with the high amounts of
randomness in this world.
The total number of species that emerge during these runs are significantly higher (but with a
lower degree of significance than comparisons with other controls) than the number of species
that emerge in the standard runs (Figure 8.6; p=0.01017). However, the last species emerges
significantly earlier in the runs without neural networks (Figure 8.5; p=6.29 × 10−8). One way to
interpret this result is that the world has converged or is beginning to converge to a stable (though
visually chaotic) state. If novelty and surprise are correlated in some way with open-endedness,
then this world is less open-ended than the standard world. It is easier to predict at least the general
features of an end state in this world.
Planting success rates are unusually high in this world (Figure 8.7) because of the intentional
decision to force every individual to make a planting attempt when it is placed randomly into the
world. (This approach was taken to avoid unfairly making the minimal criterion of reproduction
too difficult.) However, planting attempts do become increasingly more successful after the point
where the last species tends to emerge. This result further substantiates the theory that the world
has indeed converged.
Without the possibility of intentional motion, it is nearly impossible to take advantage of oppor-
tunities that arise in the world. In this case, “opportunities” is meant broadly – opportunities for
reproduction count, but also opportunities to simply respond to a new kind of stimulus in the world.
The best strategy for survival in a world where individuals have to make do with whatever environ-
ment the world places them in is simply to be somewhat generic. If all areas of the world present
the same kinds of opportunities, and if new kind of opportunities do not arise in the world, then
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there is a higher chance of survival.
What would have happened on Earth if nervous systems had never evolved? What if there were
plants, but not animals? Life in such a world would certainly be evolutionary, and the world itself
might even be beautiful, but we know that much more is possible. The results from this experi-
ment suggest that individual initiative is important for avoiding premature convergence. Thus, we
conclude that decisions about how and where individuals interact with the world should indeed be
made by the individuals themselves.
In terms of Dolson’s barriers to OEE, the visible and seemingly inevitable darkness combined
with the premature dropoff in species emergence together indicate that these runs eventually fail
to overcome the novelty barrier. That is, the world may still demonstrate change, but the types of
individuals in the world may cycle and old types of individuals may reemerge but no innovations
are occurring.
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Figure 8.1: Control 3 visual snapshots. Behavior in this world is decided semi-randomly in-
stead of being controlled by an evolved neural network. Snapshots are taken at 125,000, 250,000,
375,000, and 500,000 reproductions. Each row contains snapshots from a single run.
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Figure 8.2: Control 3 visual snapshots (each row is a single run) continued from Figure 8.1
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Figure 8.3: Representative end states, Standard and Control 3. End states of sample standard
runs (left) are presented side by side with end states of sample control 3 runs (right). The visual dis-
parity between these two sets of end states underscores the relative homogeneity that is generated
when individuals cannot make decisions about their own actions.
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(a) Controller neurons (b) Controller connections
(c) Morphology neurons (d) Morphology connections
Figure 8.4: Genome network size, Control 3. The average averages reported correspond to the
average counts over the last 250 individuals in a run averaged over 20 runs. Controller-encoding
networks become completely disconnected when controllers no longer serve the purpose of decid-
ing behaviors.
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Figure 8.5: Median last new species reproduction number, Control 3. The last species in this
world emerges at median reproduction 238,000 when individuals cannot decide for themselves
where and how to interact with the environment, compared to reproduction 330,750 in the standard
world (p=6.29×10−8). This quantitative result is consistent with the emergence of a pervasive and
somewhat chaotic dark color throughout the worlds in the visual snapshots (Figures 8.1 and 8.2)
and suggests that these worlds have either converged to a stable state or have begun to converge.
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Figure 8.6: Median total species, Control 3. The number of species found in this world (18) is
significantly different but only slightly greater than in the standard world (16; p=0.01017). Consid-
ering this result in tandem with the time of last new species emergence (Figure 8.5) indicates that a
higher volume of species are found earlier in these runs compared to the standard world. However,
this elevated degree of generativity is not sustainable.
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Figure 8.7: Median successful planting attempts, Control 3. These rates are atypically high
because every individual is forced to attempt to plant once its location has been (semi-randomly)
determined. However, a planting attempt can still fail if the individual is either placed in a location
that is not adjacent to colors matching the individual’s morphology or if the individual’s heading
is incorrect. Note that planting attempt success rates increase slightly as the runs progress and the
world becomes visibly more homogeneous.
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CHAPTER 9: SYNTHESIS: ASSESSING OPEN-ENDEDNESS IN
CHROMARIA
The purpose of the experiments in the previous chapters is to test the validity of four conditions
hypothesized to be necessary for open-ended evolution. While its definition is often the subject of
discussion (Bedau, 1998; Maynard-Smith and Szathmary, 1995; Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2008; Taylor,
1999), at its core open-endedness refers to a process that can in principle continue to innovate
forever.
One of the challenges with open-ended evolution is to avoid conflating biological evolution (which
is a specific instance of evolution) with evolution in general (which is an abstract process that could
be implemented in many different domains). The properties and dynamics of biological evolution
are not necessarily essential to open-ended evolution even if they are observed phenomena in na-
ture. For example, concepts such as relative fitness, competition, and adaptation may be features
of some specific instances of evolution, but they have not been hypothesized here to be necessary
for all possible realizations of open-ended evolution. Because we are interested here in all possible
realizations, these phenomena incidental to nature have been intentionally omitted from the pro-
posed theory and methodology, leaving the set of necessary conditions for open-ended evolution
as minimal as possible.
Open-endedness here means that a process lasts approximately forever. Somewhat more techni-
cally, exhausting an open-ended domain should be computationally intractable (possible in theory,
but impossible in practice due to the finite nature of time). Turing (1936) famously proved that
it is impossible to determine a priori whether a generic computational process will halt in a finite
amount of time. Given the obstacles to formally determining that an evolutionary process will last
forever, the most viable option so far in the field has been to examine the phenomenon in simulated
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experiments.
The experiments with control 1 (wherein no minimal criterion had to be satisfied for a planting
attempt to succeed) showed that there must be some minimal criterion, because otherwise evolution
fails to produce any nontrivial innovations. Passive drift alone does not lead to innovations that are
interesting (i.e. both novel and complex); if a system is to evolve open-endedly, it must incorporate
some sort of selective pressure. However, the other implication is that we should be open-minded as
to the implementation of such selective pressure and not necessarily default to modeling evolution
as survival of the fittest (as many gradient-based evolutionary optimization algorithms do). Instead,
it may be better to view evolution as “survival of the fit enough”, where “fit enough” is determined
by the minimal criterion. These experiments with Chromaria show that an evolutionary process
can indeed produce nontrivial innovations even in the absence of traditional competition-based
fitness and selection pressures. In fact, a method for manually adjusting the difficulty of satisfying
the minimal criterion turns out to be a useful tool for controlling the pace of evolution in artificial
systems (Soros et al., 2016). However, it is only in the complete absence of any nontrivial minimal
criterion that evolution completely collapses.
From the experiments with control 2 (wherein individuals were blind to each other), we learned
that the innovations produced by prior individuals must be accessible to the current population to
provide sufficient resources to fuel further innovations. That is, the current population must be able
to interact with the successful innovative strategies of the past for their own potential innovations
to be realized. While any particular individual may be innovative in its own right, greater novelty
and complexity result from the interaction of many individual innovations.
By the same token, individuals will only continue to innovate if they are given the ability and op-
portunity to decide where to do so. In the experiments with control 3, the system as a whole shows
signs of premature convergence when fixed rules and randomness alone determine individuals’
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actions. When fully embodied and given a neural network controller, Chromarian behaviors were
better able to adapt to an evolving world. Premature convergence to a “safe” state then becomes
less likely because when it is less necessary.
There was a fourth condition hypothesized to be necessary for open-endedness: that complexity
should have room to increase indefinitely. In principle, this requirement seems to be almost tau-
tological. However, Chromaria proved unsuitable for validating this condition because morpho-
logical and behavioral complexity and innovation occur with a minimal genome size even without
artificially restricting the size of the genetic encoding. However, while the Chromaria experiments
do not empirically validate this condition, they instead show that there exist sufficiently expres-
sive genetic encodings (such as CPPNs) such that only minimal resources are needed to represent
complex behaviors and forms. Then, allowing these encodings to grow indefinitely (as many neu-
roevolution methods do) should in principle indeed allow complexity to increase unboundedly.
Nevertheless, researchers can infer from the particular experiments with Chromaria that in prac-
tice sometimes a fixed-length encoding may be sufficient to support the appearance of open-ended
dynamics at least for a sufficiently long duration of time that a dynamically growing encoding may
not always be necessary, contingent on the aims of the experimenter. That insight is also a useful
and perhaps surprising outcome of this study.
What we have learned about open-ended evolution in general is that its success requires a somewhat
fragile synergy between multiple interacting components, and that if just one of the hypothesized
necessary conditions goes unmet then evolution will stagnate. Thus it is clear that it will be im-
portant in future investigations to make sure that the major conditions are satisfied carefully before
moving to more complicated hypotheses. Of course, it is possible that further conditions may be
identified, and their interactions may add new layers of complexity to the current understanding,
but at minimum it is safe to conclude that the presence of certain conditions cannot be ignored in
any concerted attempt to investigate the phenomenon of open-endedness.
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So, then, we address the question looming large over this whole discussion: Is Chromaria open-
ended? The answer of course depends on what is meant by “open-ended”. As mentioned earlier,
open-ended evolution researchers have moved away from a binary concept of open-endedness in
favor of more continuum-based, and perhaps more nuanced, definitions. It is instructive at this
point to consider how Chromaria may or may not overcome the various barriers to OEE defined by
Dolson et al. (2015).
As discussed in previous chapters, there is reason to believe that each of the control runs fails to
overcome either the change or novelty barriers of Dolson et al. (2015). Yet, what about Chromaria
without artificial constraint placed upon it?
Chromaria clearly overcomes the change and novelty barriers as evidenced by the emergence of
new species (marked by the successful planting of an individual with sufficiently novel color ratios)
even in the later portions of a run. The contrast with the control runs further underscores this point.
It is of course impossible to determine a priori whether a run will continue forever, but in the span
of time in which it is possible to run experiments evolution appears to still be productive.
In considering the complexity barrier, it is perhaps instructive to consider what it would look like
if a system failed to overcome the complexity barrier, meaning organisms hit a limit on the amount
of environmental information they can incorporate into their genomes. Genome size in such a sys-
tem might plateau, indicating that a ceiling has been reached. If genome size can serve as a proxy
for complexity, then it is clear from the strictly decreasing controller genome size that Chromaria
is not blocked by a complexity barrier. The explanation for the decreasing genome size is that
CPPNs, the genetic encoding for individuals in Chromaria, are capable of representing an effec-
tively inexhaustible (for the purposes of these experiments) space of viable Chromarians. Perhaps
when even longer experiments are able to be undertaken, it will become possible to empirically
investigate evolution’s ability to overcome the complexity barrier.
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The ecological barrier is met when ecosystem diversity stagnates. It is clear from visually examin-
ing Chromaria snapshots that there are different kind of Chromarians in the world and, more sig-
nificantly, that the population as a whole is changing. Overcoming the ecological barrier requires
more than overcoming the novelty barrier, which simply requires that a new kind of individual
(species) emerges at some some point. Overcoming the ecological barrier requires that the popula-
tion as a whole demonstrates some kind of innovation. Indeed, in Chromaria we see the population
innovating, moving, and expanding its reach as illustrated in Figures 9.1 and 9.2.
Whether or not we conclude that Chromaria is open-ended, it is clear that evolutionary dynamics
essential to open-endedness are adversely affected when any of the three testable conditions hy-
pothesized necessary for OEE are not satisfied. It is also important to remember that the proposed
conditions were hypothesized to be necessary, not sufficient. We should additionally remember
that the goals of these experiments were not necessarily to positively observe open-endedness, but
to validate a theory about what is necessary to even come close to achieving it. One of the tangible
outcomes of these experiments is a predictive framework that can be applied to artificial life worlds
and other evolutionary computation domains. By evaluating evolutionary domains in the context
of the validated conditions, we are able to clarify the limits of these systems and then offer ways
to increase their open-endedness.
We should also careful to note that while the experiments reported in this dissertation showed
that the testable conditions are indeed necessary for open-ended evolution in Chromaria, they do
not conclusively prove that this particular set of conditions is necessary for open-endedness in
arbitrary evolutionary systems. However, remember that the conditions were written generally and
not in terms of any particular evolutionary system (such as Chromaria, or even Earth). In terms of
artificial life, it has already been established that achieving open-ended evolution is a holy grail for
this particular research community. Constructing a domain-independent theory of open-endedness
is progress towards the increasingly important goal of unifying the often disparate fields of the
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artificial life community. It is our hope that these experiments with Chromaria are not the end, and
that these experimental results might motivate testing the theories contained herein in other alife
research areas, including more physically constrained domains such as “wet” alife.
Beyond validation
A nontrivial MC is necessary for continued evolution, but it is the “unnecessary” yet intentional
behaviors enacted on the way to satisfying the MC that make things really interesting. This insight
invites an important question: why not make interestingness itself constitute at least a portion of
the MC?
Incorporating interestingness into the MC is promising because it identifies a particular location
within the algorithm where it becomes possible to constrain search to those kinds of behaviors that
we deem interesting. However, we must take into account that whatever we deem interesting must
admit a wide breadth of behaviors from simple to complex (e.g. from single cells to human beings).
That is, we want to be careful not to overly constrain the MC or we will not get anywhere (perhaps
as a results of discarding simple but necessary stepping stones). If our goal is to generate gaits,
for instance, we cannot simply filter out robots that only take one step before falling over because
taking that one step is the foundation of more complicated behaviors such as running, jumping,
and skipping.
Furthermore, even if it admits interestingness, the minimal criterion alone does not ensure open-
ended proliferation of interesting behaviors. Comparing control 3 (wherein the function of indi-
viduals’ neural networks was replaced by a random movement scheme inspired by the artificial
life world called Avida) to the standard world, it is true that individuals satisfied the same minimal
criterion and reproduced. However, the standard world exhibited a much wider variety of possible
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life forms and world states than the control world.
What would the world look like if creatures’ movements were not random, but more rule-based?
To answer this question, and to demonstrate the importance of this question in the context of
artificial life, we might consider deterministic alife models such as L-systems (Prusinkiewicz and
Lindenmayer, 1990) and Conway’s Game of Life (Gardner, 1970). In L-systems, the evolution of
a component of a system (such as a character in a string) is determined by the state of its neighbors.
Conway’s Game of Life implements this idea in a two-dimensional grid world, where the binary
state (alive/dead, or black/white) of a single grid cell is a function of the state of its neighboring
cells. Both L-systems and the Game of Life exhibit regular and repeating patterns, even if these
patterns only repeat at large scales.
We could expect a similar outcome from a deterministic version of Chromaria (i.e. one in which
movement rules are a function of either sensor field contents or colors surrounding an individual).
In this world, the final state would be fully determined by initial conditions; only time and the
limits of computational power would stop us from instantly skipping ahead to an arbitrary future
world state. Evolution at least admits the possibility of surprise.
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Figure 9.1: Snapshots from a single run of the standard world demonstrating ecosystem diversity.
Small flashes of green on a few individuals at reproduction 150,000 lead to the emergence of
primarily green Chromarians by reproduction 187,500. (Continued in Figure 9.2.)
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Figure 9.2: Snapshots from a single run of the standard world continued from Figure 9.1
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CHAPTER 10: DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Chromaria is unlike any other alife world to date. One of its most useful and distinctive feature is
that it was designed to be visually intuitive. While quantitative analyses can be performed to rigor-
ously study its dynamics, an observer can also simply view the world to appreciate and understand
general patterns and shifts that occur in the world. Visual feedback can also provide information
about the experimental runs in real time, before post hoc run statistics are calculated. For instance,
in the experiments wherein at least one hypothesized necessary condition went unmet and evo-
lution collapsed entirely, a lack of visual change in the world indicated an obvious algorithmic
pathology. Additionally, when all of the hypothesized necessary conditions were satisfied, runs
differed from one another in terms of trajectory through color space, making it obvious to a human
observer that innovation was still taking place.
It is also interesting that this outcome (that many of the standard run end states displayed starkly
different colors, indicating unique evolutionary trajectories) was not obvious or predictable from
the preliminary experiments reported in Chapter 4. This result, and specifically the disparity be-
tween the end states reached in the preliminary experiments and the full dissertation experiments,
illustrates the necessity of running alife experiments for vast numbers of iterations. Chromaria
was designed to be memory efficient so that it could run for a longer amount of time than alife
worlds are usually run. Given that open-ended evolution is in principle supposed to last forever, it
was important to test the hypothesized necessary conditions at the upper bounds of computational
feasibility.
The results presented in Chapters 5 through 8 validated three of the four conditions hypothesized
to be necessary for open-ended evolution: that a nontrivial minimal criterion is necessary for se-
lective reproduction, that new ways of satisfying this minimal criterion should become possible as
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new individuals evolve, and that individuals should control their own interactions with the environ-
ment. However, the results that validated these conditions also showed that Chromaria cannot offer
empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that individual complexity must be able to increase
without bound. Still, validating even one of the hypothesized necessary conditions would be a
useful step towards a comprehensive theory of OEE because of the lack of any systematic empiri-
cal study verifying hypothesized conditions. The knowledge gained from this study is interesting
because it can provide concrete suggestions for increasing open-endedness in a variety of different
kinds of systems. It is different from previous works on OEE because there is an actual empirical
study conducted instead of merely a theory proposed.
The theoretical knowledge gained through these experiments can inform the design of systems both
in alife and outside of alife. To make this point clearer, the rest of this chapter explores implications
of the conditions proposed and evaluated in this dissertation to nontrivial problem domains in the
the specialized area of alife, then also discusses the framework more broadly in terms of complex
systems and computer science.
Implications for artificial life
As discussed in the Background chapter, demonstrating and understanding open-ended evolution
has been an open problem for the artificial life community since the birth of the field (Langton,
1988). Though many alife worlds have been constructed with the aim of replicating open-ended
evolutionary dynamics (Channon and Damper, 2000; Miconi and Channon, 2005; Ofria and Wilke,
2004; Ray, 1992; Spector et al., 2007; Yaeger, 1994), none have unequivocally demonstrated bona
fide open-ended evolution. These worlds can potentially be made more open-ended by revisiting
convergence-inducing design decisions illuminated by the proposed conditions.
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For instance, consider the results from control 3 in Chapter 8, which showed that evolution in
Chromaria became more predictable when individuals in the system could not decide for them-
selves when and where to interact with the world. Also recall that this control was inspired by
design choices in the Avida digital evolution system (Ofria and Wilke, 2004), wherein new off-
spring spawn in a random location. To achieve more open-ended dynamics in Avida, the proposed
conditions would suggest modifying the world such that position in the world is less dependent
on fixed rules and chance. If the proposed conditions generalize beyond Chromaria, the evolu-
tionary dynamics in Avida would be predicted to become more open-ended as a result of allowing
individuals more control over their points of interaction.
An example of a different alife model that could benefit from the proposed conditions is the Swarm
Chemistry artificial chemistry system (Sayama, 2009, 2010a,b). In Swarm Chemistry, individuals
are simulated particles, each with different kinematic parameters such preferred speed and local
perception range. Interactions between these individuals (which exist and move about in a finite
2D space) occur when they collide with each other, permanently changing the particles’ kinematic
parameters. Initial evidence that this system can be modified to target OEE is found in Sayama
(2011).
It is also interesting and important to consider the impacts and applicability of this work on non-
simulated alife domains. The systems covered in this dissertation so far largely encompass an area
of alife called soft alife (Komosinski and Adamatzky, 2007) – alife systems that are implemented
in software. However, software is not the only substrate for alife research. The two other main
research areas are hard alife (Adamatzky and Komosinski, 2007), which encompasses hardware-
based systems (i.e. robots), and wet alife (Bedau, 2007), which includes biochemical domains such
as synthetic biology. Though these research areas perform experiments in vastly different media,
they all aim to address the same questions fundamental to understanding the origins of life and the
evolution of complexity.
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Implications for complex systems
The implications of the completed experiments extend beyond artificial life; the question of what
gives rise to open-ended evolutionary dynamics is an open question not just for evolutionary com-
putation and artificial life, but for science in general. It is possible to apply the proposed conditions
to domains outside of artificial life as well, as long as the domain can be described in terms of in-
dividuals and interactions between/among them.
Complex systems are defined by the fact that they cannot be understood in terms of individual units;
the interactions between individuals must also be taken into account. However, sometimes these
interactions are so intricate that they are difficult to represent as mathematical equations. Thus,
as in Chromaria, creating a simulation that incorporates a minimal abstraction of the domain of
interest and observing it over long timescales is often the most empirically sound strategy. These
simulations, known as agent-based models (Abar et al., 2017; Bonabeau, 2002) have long been
a useful tool for computationally studying the natural and social sciences. Though agent-based
models are not necessarily evolutionary in the Darwinian sense (meaning they do not include one of
the following: reproduction, inheritance, or variability), it is instructive to consider them in terms
of individuality and interactions for the purpose of understanding how the proposed conditions
could be applied to domains beyond artificial life.
In natural systems, including domains from the sciences such as biology and chemistry, “individ-
uals” are often simple units that enact only simple behaviors. In chemical systems, the individuals
might be molecules that can attach to other molecules (subject to rules about which attachments are
valid). This organizational structure could be applied both to natural chemistry, wherein combina-
tion rules are determined by the laws of physics and electromagnetism, and artificial chemistries,
wherein molecules or particles are simulated and combination rules are determined by a program-
mer. Rising to the level of biology, the notion of individuality is expressed intuitively as a plant,
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animal, or other higher order life form. Interactions, then, can include a variety of behaviors in-
cluding mating and resource consumption. The social sciences often make use of agent-based
modeling as well to describe and simulate human systems. In the context of economics, for in-
stance, individuals are people who interact with each other by buying and selling goods.
This list of systems that can be conceptualized in terms of individuals and interactions is of course
not exhaustive. For instance, it does not include applied domains such as technological innovation
and cultural innovation (the development of new art, music, fashion, etc)˙. Technological innovation
in particular has been proposed as a non-biological domain that evolves open-endedly (Taylor et al.,
2016), with populations consisting of technology adopters, technology designers, technological
innovations, and technological products. We might consider other creative domains this way too
in the context of open-ended evolution, with creators and creations both serving as individuals that
can interact with each other in domain-dependent ways.
The benefits of applying the proposed conditions to natural and artificial systems are threefold.
First, analyzing whether such systems are potentially open-ended, or evolutionary, or both, can help
validate whether the proposed conditions actually describe open-ended evolution or instead some
other related class of process. Second, considering a variety of historically disparate domains from
a unified ecological perspective may inspire new hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying
those systems. Third, we will increase our ability to build simulations of these real-world systems,
thereby improving tools for empirical analyses of these domains.
One particularly interesting research question is what mechanisms underly the human brain. Obvi-
ously the brain is made up of neurons, but other animals’ brains are made up of neurons too. What
is it about the neurons of the (typical) human brain that give it higher, or at least different, capa-
bilities than other animals? More importantly, what processes caused the human brain to become
different in this way? If the brain can be conceptualized in terms of individuals and interactions,
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then perhaps the development of the brain can also be thought of as an open-ended process. In
fact, Fernando et al. (2012) and Fedor et al. (2017), building on the work of Edelman (1987), de-
velop a model to this end wherein neural firing patterns constitute individuals that combine and
reproduce in a Darwinian fashion. It is possible that continued experimentation will deepen our
understanding of human intelligence.
Implications for computer science
The question of whether a machine can think, famously posed formally by Turing (1950), lies at the
heart not just of artificial intelligence, but at the heart of computer science. The main difficulty in
answering this question lies in the ambiguity and underspecificity of the term “think”. “Thinking”
generally denotes what intelligent people do, but it is nearly impossible to come up with a general
yet precise definitions of what behaviors exactly intelligence encompasses. A reasonable concept
of intelligence, implemented in computational processes or otherwise, should probably incorporate
both focused problem solving and more open-ended creativity. Balancing the two characteristics is
currently an area of significant interest in evolutionary computation. Quality Diversity algorithms
(Pugh et al., 2016) in particular, reviewed in Chapter 2, aim to blend these characteristics optimally
to solve problems outside the traditional realm of optimization problems. It is interesting, then, to
consider how the proposed conditions can inform the design of evolutionary algorithms.
Different engineering applications may best be served by different degrees of freedom with respect
to the conditions shown to be necessary for open-endedness. As such, the goal here has not been
to establish a firm prescription for designing such systems but instead to provide at least somewhat
of an understanding of how changing certain (sometimes implicit) variables affects the behaviors
of the system being constructed. Instead, the framework should be thought of as revealing what
bad design choices to avoid rather than prescribing a one-size-fits-all solution to computational
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problems. The conditions are designed to be minimal, so one approach might be to experiment
with relaxing design constraints to only reach that minimal threshold and then building out from
there. Of course, this recommendation assumes that we want to maximize creativity. In fact, for
most practical considerations there likely exists a continuum with convergence and optimization at
one end and open-ended creativity at the other end. The extent to which you want to drive system
design towards or away from the conditions specified in this dissertation depend on the aims of the
domain, but both aims are informed by this work.
One application to consider is machine learning and artificial intelligence writ broadly. A common
criticism of AI throughout its history is that there has not yet emerged a true “general” intelli-
gence; intelligent systems are mainly built to achieve a single, specific purpose. This situation
results from a few combined factors, but much like the goal of achieving open-ended evolution,
the goal of open-ended artificial intelligence – AI that can continue to develop an arbitrarily large
number of behaviors and capabilities that are both interesting and increasingly complex – has
proven unexpectedly elusive.
It may be interesting to consider the recent emergence of deep learning (Bengio, 2012; Hinton,
2007; Hinton et al., 2006) as a popular methodology for artificial intelligence. Deep learning at
first seemed to be, possibly, an important part of the solution to the problem of artificial general in-
telligence. Though the seeds of hierarchical processing schemes had been identified as important
and useful (particularly in the context of image processing, mirroring the hierarchical organiza-
tion of the visual processing pathways in mammalian brains) as far back as the 1960’s (Hubel
and Wiesel, 1965), only recently, with the advent of cheap and high-performing GPUs, has it be-
come possible for hierarchical models to process information on a large enough scale to really
accomplish anything interesting. Deep learning models, using the same underlying concept of
gradient-following training algorithms as the early connectionist models, suddenly began achiev-
ing previously impossible performance on classical pattern recognition datasets such as MNIST.
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The past decade has seen an intense focus on machine learning models both in academia and in
industry.
One area that has been particularly interesting to observe is style transfer (Gatys et al., 2016).
Popularized by DeepDream (Mordvintsev et al., 2015), this class of algorithms is trained on a
massive dataset of creative works such as art, music, or writing and then the model learned by
the system is used to compose “new” works in the the style of the works in the training set. The
products of these systems have certainly been amusing. However, once you have seen one plate
of spaghetti grotesquely deformed into a dog with too many eyes, you have effectively seen them
all. The main problem with DeepDream, and with most convergence-oriented machine learning
systems, is that once the model is trained, new kinds of transformations are not possible. There’s no
real creativity here. However, just as divergent search algorithms such as novelty search (Lehman
and Stanley, 2011a) challenged and improved upon the gradient-following paradigm in the domain
of evolutionary algorithms, perhaps it is similarly possible to reconsider deep learning systems in
the context of OEE to make them more creative.
The field of digital entertainment seems particularly able to benefit from studies of highly produc-
tive generative processes, as evidenced by the promise and then disappointment of the 2016 video
game No Man’s Sky1. The game was advertised as a a space exploration game so large that no
player could ever explore the entirety of the universe. The main problem was that, while impres-
sively large, the environments created by the (procedural) generation system were repetitive riffs
on the same general theme. What people hoped for with respect to that game was what many of us
want from life: a seemingly endless source of novel experiences. We do not want to be bored, sub-
jected to the trivial, the totally predictable, the mundane. At the same time, we do not want chaos
and we do not want things to change too abruptly; we want things to make sense when considered
1Copyright c©2016 Hello Games
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in hindsight. We want to be able to construct a cohesive narrative around our life experiences. A
validated set of necessary conditions can potentially guide the design of games like No Man’s Sky
so that they can be truly open-ended.
Evolution offers a unique and paradoxical combination of controlled constraint while also being out
of our control. Implemented in nature, it has demonstrated the capacity for unparalleled breadth of
creativity at scale. Of course, evolution is not the answer to every problem, and many problems are
solvable with much simpler and more controllable methods. For instance, procedurally-generated
systems were instrumental in expanding the scope of early video games such as Rogue and Elite2,
which were highly constrained in terms of physical memory and as a results used mathematical
functions to reliably and deterministically generate consistent environments on the fly instead of
having to store them in persistent memory. The claim in this dissertation is not that evolution,
open-ended or otherwise, is a panacea for computer science. However, for a certain class of very
interesting problems requiring some degree of creativity, evolution seems uniquely capable of
success where other algorithms have proven ineffective.
There has of course been continual discussion over the years about whether a computer can even be
creative in the first place (Boden, 1990; Colton and Wiggins, 2012; Jefferson, 1949; Turing, 1950).
These discussions ultimately reduce to a debate over whether or not humans are fundamentally
special in some way, which is outside the scope of this dissertation. What is more salient to the
discussion of open-ended evolution is the fact that no creative AI has thus far produced artifacts
that are sufficiently interesting, novel, and complex to put an end to this debate.
It should hopefully be clear at this point that the questions of open-ended evolution (in artifi-
cial life), artificial general intelligence, and computational creativity are different flavors of the
same fundamental question about the limits of computational processes. The recent successes (and
2Copyright c©1984 Acornsoft
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shortcomings) of deep learning highlight the importance of hardware, independently of algorith-
mic innovations, on our ability to answer from a computational perspective the big questions about
ourselves and the world we inhabit. AI research serves many purposes for many people, and one
of those purposes is not just to achieve human-competitive performance on some task but to un-
derstand (as a result of building such a system) something about the black box of ourselves, our
minds, and our experiences.
As stated at the beginning of this dissertation, the experiments summarized herein are not about
biology even though they focus on evolutionary dynamics. In fact, the results speak to a canonical
problem not just for artificial life, but for computer science in general: is it possible to construct
a process that never ends? Exploring the question of what components might be necessary for an
open-ended process with an empirical methodology has required exploring the limits of modern
computation. The question of what makes certain processes tractable versus intractable, regardless
of the domain, is a question at the heart of computation theory and it is exactly that question that
this dissertation speaks to. It just so happens that the particular class of processes explored in this
dissertation are inspired by biology.
While Chromaria may not implement the same level of scale as Earth, performing experiments in a
systematic way still allows us to explore questions about both life on Earth and creative processes in
general with tools beyond pure speculation and theory. In a sense, the core issue addressed by this
dissertation is what evolution is. It does not always serve as an optimizer, nor does it intentionally
reflect and design. Instead, it meanders. It ignores what does not work and otherwise stays open-
minded. It is an intrepid adventurer, always blazing trails through the unexplored. Understanding
open-ended evolution informs our understanding of life, and though the completed experiments
may not be the final word on this understanding, they are a much-needed stepping stone along
the way. While limited by the current state of technology, it is important to recognize that we
have at our disposal tools that were not accessible to Darwin, Turing, and the other revolutionaries
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whose ideas laid the groundwork for the research being done today. While we might not be able
to answer these questions definitively at present (insofar as we ever will), we can certainly make
some progress with what resources we have.
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION
This dissertation described the first scientific endeavor to systematically test an OEE framework
in an alife world and thereby contribute to the solution of an unsolved mystery about evolution-
ary systems. It first (1) enumerated a set of conditions hypothesized to be necessary for OEE
and (2) introduced an artificial life world called Chromaria that incorporates each of the hypoth-
esized necessary conditions. It then (3) described a set of experiments with Chromaria designed
to empirically validate the hypothesized necessary conditions. The results of these experiments
supported the hypotheses that open-ended evolutionary systems must implement some minimal
criterion for reproduction, must allow opportunities for new ways of satisfying the minimal crite-
rion to be created via interactions between individuals, and must allow individuals to control how
and where they interact with the world. These results advance the field of artificial life toward its
long-standing goal of finally developing an empirically validated theory of what is necessary to
implement an open-ended evolutionary process in a computational domain.
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